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This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the promises of data-driven
decision making in the design and operationalization of complex auction markets. In the
first essay, we derive a structural econometric model to understand the effect of auction
design parameters on sellers' revenues. In addition, we develop a dynamic optimization
approach which makes use of the rich structural properties identified from empirical data
to guide auctioneers in setting these parameters in real-time. In the second essay, we
focus on bidding strategies across different market channels and examine the interactions
between different strategies and auction design parameters. In the third essay, we
investigate the effect of information revelation policy on price dynamics and market
performance. This research offers important implications to both theory and practice of
decision-making in information-rich and time-critical markets. From the theoretical
perspective, this is, to our best knowledge, the first research that systematically examines
the interplay of different informational and strategic factors in dynamic, multi-channel
auction markets. In particular, it sheds light on real-time decision support in complex
markets and thus contributes to the nascent literature on smart markets. From the
managerial perspective, our research shows that advanced data analytics tools have great
potential in facilitating decision-making in complex, real-world business environments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The past two decades have seen an explosion of digital data in every sector of the global econ-
omy1. According to the research firm IDC, from 2005 to 2020, the global volume of data will
grow by a factor of 300, from 130 exabytes to 40,000 exabytes, or 40 trillion gigabytes. Such a
revolution from data scarcity to data abundance brings great opportunities to businesses across
the world.
In particular, the increased accessibility of data has enabled a different way of making deci-
sions that involves more empirical evidence rather than personal experience, intuition, or belief.
Such a new practice of “basing decisions on the analysis of data rather than purely on intuition”
has been coined as data-driven decision making (Provost and Fawcett, 2013), and there has been
a growing interest in its promises across different domains. For example, as a leading player
in the retail industry, Walmart has pioneered the data-driven practices in analyzing data from
multiple sales channels, catalogs, stores, demographic and online interactions to tailor product
selections and determine the timing of price markdowns. The Internet giants such as Google
and Facebook are customizing their services by mining users’ internet browsing activity. The
more traditional sectors such as manufacturing are also leveraging the power of data to improve
efficiency and sustain the growth.
Previous studies have shown that companies that adopted a data-driven approach are more
productive and profitable than their competitors (Brynjolfsson et al., 2011). In this research,
we focus on the value of data-driven decision making at market level and seek to illustrate and
quantify its benefits in the design and operationalization of auction markets.
1For more details, see “A special report on managing information: Data, data everywhere,” The Economist,
February 25, 2010.
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2 Motivation
1.1 Motivation
Auctions play a critical role in the modern society: governments use auctions to sell treasury
bills, mineral rights and many other assets; firms use auctions to subcontract work, buy services
and raw materials; individuals also participate in auctions of various consumer products such
as art, antiques, cars, or even houses (Klemperer, 1999). The Internet has expanded the scope
and reach of auctions tremendously: by breaking the physical limitations such as geography,
time, and space, online auctions open up vast new opportunities for businesses of all sizes and
become an indispensable part of the new economy (Bajari and Hortac¸su, 2004).
Despite the great promise they hold, online auctions also pose many new challenges for
practitioners and academics. For example, Bapna et al. (2001) point out that the behavior of
the different economic agents in auctions is heavily influenced by the online context in which
they take place. As the result, many of the elegant and powerful results from the classical
game-theoretic analysis of auctions do not apply any more. Dealing with these complications
requires not only careful attention to the institutional details of these emerging markets, but
also new analytical and computational tools to supplement the traditional game-theoretic or
decision-theoretic models (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994).
Over the past decades, Information Systems (IS) researchers have made significant contribu-
tions to practical auction design by investigating different bidding strategies and price dynamics
in real-world auctions. For example, Kauffman and Wood (2006) studied the auctions of rare
US coins on eBay and found that bidders tend to increase their bids for the same item if others
also express interests in the item. More recently, Goes et al. (2010) examined the evolution of
bidders’ willingness-to-pay using a large dataset from Sam’s club auctions. They demonstrated
that bidders update their willingness-to-pay in sequential auctions based on their demand, par-
ticipation experience, the outcomes in previous auctions and auction design parameters.
Further, researchers have made considerable progress in the development of computational
tools to facilitate decision making in complex auction markets (Adomavicius and Gupta, 2005;
Adomavicius et al., 2009; Ketter et al., 2012; Mehta and Bhattacharya, 2006). This has given
rise to the novel, interdisciplinary research area, namely, smart markets (Bichler et al., 2010;
McCabe et al., 1991). The primary goal of smart market research is to develop theoretically
guided computational tools to understand the characteristics of a complex trading environment
and facilitate real-time decision making in these complex environments (Bichler et al., 2010).
Our current research shares a similar initiative by systematically examining real-time decision
making in complex auction markets.
19
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1.2 Research Question
In light of the pervasive adoption of data-driven approaches in auction research, we raise the
following research question: how to leverage the power of data to improve the performance of
complex auction markets?
Prior research has proposed different performance criteria such as allocative efficiency and
revenue maximization (Krishna, 2002). However, since in most real-world auctions bidders
never reveal their private values, it is impossible to compute the allocative efficiency of given
auctions. In this research, we use revenue maximization as the key performance measure.
Given the complex interplay of different informational and strategic factors in these markets,
we conduct three specific studies to address this research question. The common thread linking
these studies is the focus on the real-time interaction between auctioneers and bidders.
Our first study examines how auction design parameters affect bidders’ real-time decisions
and market processes. We derive a structural econometric model (Paarsch et al., 2006) which
allows us to conduct policy counterfactuals to assess the effectiveness of alternative auction
designs. Based on the estimation of the structural properties, we also develop a dynamic opti-
mization approach to guide the setting of the auction design parameters.
The second study explores bidding strategies across different market channels using a unique
and extensive data set from a complex B2B market. In addition to identifying and characterizing
the bidding strategies, we also examine the antecedents and consequences of these strategies, as
well as their interactions with auction design parameters. This study complements the existing
literature on bidder heterogeneity in business-to-consumer (B2C) markets (Bapna et al., 2004;
Goes et al., 2012).
In the third study, we focus on the information transparency issues in sequential auctions.
Different from most of the previous studies on information revelation policies in auctions which
are purely analytical, we conduct a field experiment to examine the effects of different informa-
tion revelation policies on price dynamics and market performance. Specifically, we compare
the bidding dynamics under two settings: the high-transparency setting where winners’ iden-
tities are revealed publicly and the low-transparency setting where winners’ identities are kept
hidden from public view. The findings from this study provide useful implications for the design
of information policies in multi-channel markets.
1.3 Methodology
We adopt a multi-method approach to address the main research question. The rationale for
choosing such multi-method approach is that each research method has its strengths and weak-
20
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nesses and the combination of multiple methods can provide richer and more reliable results (Mingers,
2001). In the following we briefly describe each of the methods used in this research. The
methodological details of the individual studies will be discussed in the respective chapters.
Structural Modeling. Structural modeling has become increasingly popular in auction re-
search over the past decades. By assuming that all the observed bids are the equilibrium bids of
the auction model under consideration, the goal of structural modeling is to identify the struc-
tural properties of the auction model, particularly the underlying distribution of bidders’ values.
The identification of these structural properties can be used to evaluate a given auction format
and study the policy counterfactuals, i.e., how changes in auction rules would affect sellers’
revenue and market clearing speed.
Simulation. With the advance of computational power, simulation has been used in a wide
spectrum of research. Different from conventional research methods which focuses on answer-
ing “What, how and why” questions, simulation allows us to assume the inherent complexity of
organizational systems as given and helps answer the “What if ” questions. In particular, market
phenomena that are too complex for conventional analytical or empirical approaches can be ad-
dressed by simulation methods. For example, McMillan (2003) conducts various simulations to
understand the performance of different market designs. In our case, we use simulation together
with structural modeling to provide normative insights for the design and operationalization of
sequential B2B auctions.
Statistical Machine Learning. As the natural outgrowth of the intersection of Computer Sci-
ence and Statistics, statistical machine learning techniques allow us to identify patterns of large-
scale, dynamical data streams arising from various application domains (Hastie et al., 2009). In
this research, we use both parametric and non-parametric methods to understand bidders’ de-
cisions in a complex auction market. Compared to the structural modeling, statistical machine
learning prioritizes the goodness-of-fit to the empirical data.
Field Experiment. Experiments are useful to make causal inference about certain effect. De-
spite its increased external validity, field experiments are much less used than lab experiments
when studying market design. This is mainly due to the extremely high cost and difficulties in
conducting controlled, randomized trials in the field of interest. We are fortunate to team up
with the policy makers of a large Business-to-Business (B2B) market and had the opportunity
to conduct a large-scale field experiment on information revelation policy.
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1.4 Structure
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed introduction
to the research context, namely, the Dutch Flower Auctions. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are three
specific studies that address the central research question from different angles. Finally, Chapter
6 summarizes the contribution of this research and discusses the limitation and future work.
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the structure of this dissertation.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Research Context
Chapter 3
Structural Econometric 
Analysis
Chapter 5
Information 
Transparency
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Chapter 4
Bidder
Heterogeneity
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Research Context
The empirical data used in this research are obtained from the largest wholesale market of cut
flowers and ornamental plants in the world, namely, the Dutch Flower Auctions. In this chapter,
we will first justify the choice of this empirical setting and then introduce this specific auction
market in detail.
The primary reason for choosing the Dutch Flower Auctions as the research context is that
they add real-world complications to the decision-making process in classical auction mod-
els. For example, bidders can demand multiple units in each round of the sequential auctions
(see Section ) and both bidders and auctioneers have to make their decisions within a few sec-
onds. They also highlight the important transformation of moving from place to space, which
transcends the particular market practices. Finally, the Dutch Flower Auctions are worthy of
attention in their own rights given their significant economic and social importance.
2.1 The Dutch Flower Auctions
The Dutch Flower Auctions play a critical role in maintaining the Netherlands’ leadership in
the floriculture industry (Kambil and van Heck, 2002). They account for more than 60% of
the global flower trade. In 2012, the total turnover of the auctioned products (i.e., cut flowers,
indoor and outdoor plants) is approximately e4.4 billion1. Some of the flowers originate in the
Netherlands, but many originate in countries like Columbia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.
In the late afternoon, domestic growers send their flowers to the main auction sites2. Meanwhile,
planes loaded with imported flowers land at the Schiphol airport near Amsterdam. Later in the
evening, the fresh products are transported to refrigerated rooms in the auction sites where the
flowers are sorted and grouped in similar types. These include well-known products such as
1The turnover of cut flowers is over e2.4 billion.
2Currently, there are 5 auction sites within the country: Aalsmeer, Naaldwijk, Rijnsburg, Bleiswijk and Eelde.
There is also one auction site located at the Dutch-German border. However, the turnover from this auction site is
not consolidated with the DFA totals.
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roses, chrysanthemums, lilies and tulips in various categories as well as niche products such as
matricaria. The quality of the flowers is inspected by professional appraisers. Many buyers also
frequently visit the storage rooms to check the products in early morning before auctions start.
On weekdays, up to 40 auctions occur simultaneously from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. Flowers
are auctioned as separate lots, which are defined as the total supply of a given homogeneous
product from a given supplier on a given day. The size of a lot can vary from a few units to
more than a hundred units, and each unit consists of 20 to 80 stems, depending on the type and
quality of flower. Buyers3 can either bid in the auction halls or via a remote bidding system
which allows them to view, filter and even pre-mark the full range of flowers prior to bidding.
At any time, an individual bidder, whatever bidding onsite or remotely, can only participate in
one auction, however, an institutional buyer can delegate several bidders to the auctions running
in parallel.
2.2 The Mechanism
The Dutch Flower Auctions use the Dutch auction mechanism. They are implemented using
fast-paced auction clocks displayed on a electronic board. Aside from the current asking price,
each clock also contains information about the setup of the current auction (for example, mon-
etary unit, minimum purchase units as well as bundling properties). Further, bidders can also
see the information of the product under auction (name of the product, identity of the grower,
various quality indicators and a representative picture of the product) from the electronic board.
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the clock interface.
At the beginning of an auction, the auctioneer decides the starting position of the clock
which corresponds to a high price of the product, and sets the clock in motion. As the clock
ticks down counterclockwise, each bidder can stop the clock by pressing a button indicating that
she is willing to accept the price corresponding to the current clock position. The first bidder
who makes a bid wins. The winning bidder, whose identity is shown on the clock screen, can
select the portion of the lot being auctioned (which must exceed the minimum required amount).
If the winning bidder does not select the entire available amount, the clock ticks backward and
restarts at a high position, and the auction continues. This process repeats until the entire lot
is sold, or the price falls below the seller’s reserve price4, in which case any unsold goods in
that lot are destroyed. Such multi-unit, sequential Dutch auctions operate in a time-efficient
manner: on average, each transaction takes 3 to 5 seconds. Therefore, they are well suited to
the wholesale market of flowers.
3Here buyers could be individuals or organizations.
4Currently, the reserve price is fixed for the entire year, regardless of auction site and flower types.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the auction screen. The setup of the current auction is shown on the
clock whereas the product information and the upcoming schedules are shown on the right and
top-left of the screen, respectively.
Table 2.1 gives a stylized example of a sequence of transactions that can be found in our
data set. In this example, a lot containing 18 units is sold. At the beginning of each round, the
auctioneer sets the starting price and minimum purchase quantity (italicized in the table). The
sales prices are not monotonically decreasing or increasing5. Also, unlike the existing studies
which focus on the situation where only one unit is sold in each round, in our case, the purchase
quantity in each round can vary a lot. Because bidders do not know a priori whether there
will be units left after the current round of auction, they face much higher uncertainty in these
auctions.
Table 2.1: A sample entry in a logbook. The auctioneer’s decision variables are italicized.
Transaction
Index
Transaction
Time
Seller
ID
Flower
ID
Stem
Length
Stems
Per
Unit
Available
Units
Minimum
Purchase
Units
Starting
Price
(cent)
Buyer
ID
Purchase
Units
Price
(cent)
171 08:10:54 5644 103668 70 50 18 1 100 439 2 22
172 08:10:56 5644 103668 70 50 16 3 41 395 5 20
173 08:10:57 5644 103668 70 50 11 4 39 439 7 21
174 08:10:59 5644 103668 70 50 4 4 40 563 4 20
5Van den Berg et al. (2001) show empirical evidence for declining price anomaly in the flower auctions; how-
ever, if we look at individual auctions, price trends are inconclusive in these multi-unit sequential auctions.
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2.2.1 The Online Bidding Channel
In June 1996, the DFA introduced the remote buying application (KOA)6 , an online bidding
system that enables bidders to participate in auctions without being physically present in the
auction hall. Initially, such online bidding channel only attracts a few large buyers for two
reasons. First, KOA system requires a significant investment in hardware and software. This
includes dedicated computers, communication system between the auction hall and the comput-
ers used for bidding as well as monthly subscription fee for approximately e220 in order to use
the system. Second, large buyers have strong incentive to adopt such remote bidding system.
Traditionally, large buyers need to have several bidders to follow auctions that run in parallel.
Since KOA allows each bidder to effectively monitor several auction clocks at the same time, it
can help the large buyers to save personnel costs.
Over the past few years, KOA has become a great success. Interviews7 with buyers revealed
two major benefits brought by such online channel, the reduced travel costs and the enhanced
monitoring capabilities. Some large buyers also point out that KOA allows them to better coor-
dinate the purchases in the auctions and the sales to the end customers. Despite the enthusiasm
of the buyers, results from previous studies are inconclusive with regard to the impact of KOA
on winning prices.
2.3 The Auctioneers’ Problem
The auctioneers in the Dutch Flower Auctions represent the growers. Therefore, an important
goal of their work is to maximize the total revenue. Further, given the perishability of flowers,
it is also critical to achieve a quick turnaround in these auctions. In fact, the total time for con-
ducting the auctions has long been a hard constraint for the growth of the market. Auctioneers
can influence the dynamics of the sequential multi-unit auctions by controlling the key auction
parameters including clock speed, starting prices, minimum purchase quantities and reserve
prices. The choices of these parameters often involve tradeoffs between revenue maximiza-
tion and the total time need to finish the auctions. For example, by increasing the minimum
purchase quantities, auctioneers can speed up the auctions quite substantially, yet such benefit
often comes at a cost of revenue reduction (Lu et al., 2013).
Further, auctioneers can also influence the bidding competition by disclosing or withhold-
ing extra information about market states (for example, the number of bidders logged into the
bidding system) during an auction. The (un)disclosure of certain information have both direct
6In Dutch, the Remote-Buying or Buying-At-A-Distance initiative is referred as KOA, the acronym of ”Kopen
op Afstand.”
7We conducted several onsite interviews with buyers of different sizes during 2011 and 2012.
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and indirect effects on bidding behavior in sequential rounds. First, bidders are able to use
the extra information disclosed in the previous rounds to update their beliefs about their oppo-
nents and adjust their bidding strategies. Second, bidders might take into account such direct
informational effect and strategically alter their behavior in the previous rounds8.
As more and more bidders adopt the remote bidding application and participate in the auc-
tions via the online channel, the design and implementation of information policies, particularly
the information revelation policies become increasingly critical to the revenue generation of
these auctions. For one thing, the online channel allows more bidders to participate in the auc-
tions and significantly increases the market-level uncertainty. For another, it also allows bidders
especially the large buyers to better coordinate their bidding activities across different auction
sites9. Unfortunately, however, due to the limited availability of proprietary data, there is a lack
of normative insights that may inform or guide the design of these information policies.
8Such direct and indirect effects are related to bidders’ learning in sequential auctions which has been studied
in Jeitschko (1998). However, our main focus is the auctioneer’s role in such learning process.
9The auction schedules at different sites are not synchronized and there is indeed potential for arbitrage.
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Chapter 3
Structural Econometric Analysis of
Sequential B2B Auctions1
3.1 Introduction
Auctions have long been used as effective mechanisms for price discovery and resource allo-
cation. Beginning with the work of Vickrey (1961), a large body of literature has investigated
various informational and strategic factors in auction design using the game-theoretic frame-
work2. Despite its sharp predictions about the optimal way to design and conduct auctions,
most of the theoretical work focuses on stylized settings and rarely considers the real-world
operating environment (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994). This highlights the necessity of stud-
ies addressing the gap between the predictions derived from classical auction theory and the
practical auction design.
The proliferation of online auctions has spawned a wide stream of empirical research on
real-life bidding behavior and practical auction design (Bajari and Hortac¸su, 2004). However,
most of the empirical work has exclusively focused on B2C or C2C auctions. Comparatively, lit-
tle attention has been paid to B2B auctions which usually involve professional or expert bidders
and carry much higher economic stakes3. Further, the existing studies often take the reduced-
form approach which aim to characterize bidder behavior in auctions rather than to use the
1This chapter is based on two conference papers “Designing Intelligent Software Agents for B2B Sequential
Dutch Auctions: A Structural Econometric Approach” and “Applying Structural Econometric Analysis to B2B
Sequential Dutch Auctions”, co-authored with Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter and Eric van Heck, and is currently
under review at a top-ranked journal in management. The author of this dissertation is the first author of these
papers. We thank the seminar participants at Carlson School of Management and the Wharton School, at the Con-
ference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST 2013), International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS 2013), and at the Statistical Challenges in eCommerce Research Symposium (SCECR 2013) for feedback
and discussions. The authors acknowledge the comprehensive support from FloraHolland.
2For a survey of the literature, see Part A of Klemperer (1999)
3According to a recent report by Forrester, by the end of 2013, customer-facing front-end B2B eCommerce in
the US will reach $559 billion, while the B2C market will bring in less than half that at $252 billion.
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bidding function to map the observed bids to bidders valuations. For example, using bidders’
behavioral variables such as entering time and bidding frequency, Bapna et al. (2004) uncover
the patten of buyers’ bidding strategies in an online B2C environment. Despite its popularity,
such reduced-form approach, however, is not able to predict the effects of policy changes in
bidding procedure. This is because such policy changes often constitute changes of individual
bidder’ strategic behavior as well as their interactions. For example, as Arora et al. (2007);
Kannan (2012) have shown that changes on information revelation policies have strong impact
on bidders’ strategies in sequential auctions.
To address these research gaps, we adopt the so-called structural econometric approach (Paarsch
et al., 2006) to study sequential auctions in a complex B2B market. Structural models, as op-
posed to reduced-form models, derive econometric specifications from economic theories where
individuals or organizations are assumed to pursue profit-maximizing behavior. By explicitly
recovering the key parameters of the derived models, for example, the parameters characterizing
the distribution of bidders’ valuations, the structural approach allows us to perform policy coun-
terfactuals by simulating results under different auction designs, and thus be able to compare
the expected performance of alternative designs.
Our paper makes three important contributions. First, we extend the existing structural
models in empirical auction research (see Hickman et al. (2012) for a guide to the literature)
to deal with sequential auctions where bidders can purchase multiple units of products in each
round. Currently, most of the structural modeling work focuses on single-unit auctions, for ex-
ample, Donald and Paarsch (1996); Guerre et al. (2000); Laffont and Vuong (1995); Paarsch
(1997). Of the few papers which investigated multi-unit sequential auctions (Brendstrup, 2002;
Brendstrup and Paarsch, 2006; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003), bidders are either assumed
to have single-unit demand throughout an auction or they can acquire at most one unit in each
round. Relaxing the single-unit assumption introduces a number of econometric and computa-
tional challenges to the structural modeling of sequential auctions. For example, how to obtain a
good estimate of bidders’ demand distribution and incorporate it in the characterization of their
bidding strategies? We exploit the unique features of the empirical auction environment and for-
malize bidders’ decision-making process in the auctions in a way that their entry decisions only
depend on their (multi-unit) demand. By doing so, we avoid the estimation of joint distribution
of bidders’ valuation and demand without loss of essential properties of these auctions.
Second, we apply our model to a complex B2B market, namely, the Dutch Flower Auctions.
Apart from providing rich empirical data for auction research, the Dutch Flower Auctions are
economically important: they account for more than 60% of the global flower trade and the
annual turnover from these auctions amounts to more than 4 billion Euros. Given such sheer
magnitude of transactions processed via these auctions, it is important for the auctioneers, who
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act as the market operators, to design and implement the auctions in such a way that they best
meet the pre-defined goals, e.g., maximizing the expected revenue. However, due to cognitive
and computational limitations, auctioneers cannot sufficiently process the market information
and adjust the key auction parameters accordingly to influence the market dynamics under the
extreme time pressure in these auctions. To address these challenges, we develop a dynamic
optimization approach built on the structural properties of these auctions. The empirical re-
sults show that our approach is very promising in guiding auctioneers’ decision-making in the
complex environment.
Third, our work also contributes to the nascent literature on the design and implementation
of smart markets (Bichler et al., 2010). Smart market research aims to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the characteristics of complex trading environments and assist human decision
makers in these complex environments via the use of various computational tools. Over the past
decade, IS researchers have already made extensive progress in the development and deploy-
ment of different computational tools (Adomavicius and Gupta, 2005; Adomavicius et al., 2009;
Bapna et al., 2003; Ketter et al., 2009, 2012; Mehta and Bhattacharya, 2006). Specifically, re-
searchers have demonstrated that software agents (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995) have great
potential for automating, augmenting and coordinating decision processes in complex environ-
ments. In light of this, we propose to use intelligent software agents to facilitate auctioneers’
decision-making in the sequential auctions. By learning from the historical transactions as well
as the experience of auctioneers, these agents can predict the future auction states and offer
well-grounded recommendations to auctioneers to optimize the auctions in real-time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the data and preliminary analysis. Section 4 presents the the structural
model. In Section 5 we first discuss the estimation results and then conduct policy simulations
to assess the performance of alternative auction formats. Further, we also demonstrate how
to use structural analysis to dynamically optimize key auction design parameters in sequential
auctions. Finally, in Section 6, we draw conclusions and outline the future research directions.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section, we first differentiate our work from the existing work on structural econometric
methods in auction research and then review the nascent literature on agent-based decision
support.
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3.2.1 Structural Econometric Literature
Structural modeling of auction data has emerged as one of the most successful areas of structural
econometric research. As opposed to the traditional reduced-form approach in empirical auction
research, the structural approach has two important advantages (Hickman et al., 2012): first, it
allows for policy counterfactuals of situations not observed from the empirical data; second,
by incorporating economic theory, it enables the inferences about allocative efficiency, bidders’
risk attitudes as well as other properties regarding information structure.
Over the past two decades, econometricians have developed both parametric (Donald and
Paarsch, 1996; Laffont and Vuong, 1995; Paarsch, 1992)) and non-parametric (Flambard and
Perrigne, 2006; Guerre et al., 2000) methods for common auction formats within the indepen-
dent private value paradigm (IPV), and thus provide useful tools for policy analysis. From
the methodology perspective, our current work is closely related to the seminal paper on non-
parametric estimation by Guerre et al. (2000). However, there are some fundamental differ-
ences between the setup in Guerre et al. (2000) and our work. First of all, Guerre et al. (2000)
deals with single-object auctions whereas we are studying sequential auctions. Identification
and estimation in sequential auctions are much more challenging than in the single-object case
-when bidders’ private values and strategies are high-dimensional, little is known about the equi-
librium characterization (Hickman et al., 2012). In particular, when leaving aside the restrictive
assumption that all bidders have single-unit demand, a full treatment of sequential auctions is
only possible under very special cases (Brendstrup, 2007; Donald et al., 2006; Katzman, 1999).
In our case, the fact that bidders have multi-unit demands at each stage of a sequential auction
pushes it even further.
Secondly, Guerre et al. (2000) assumes the number of bidders is known a priori. Although
such assumption is quite common in both theoretical and empirical auction literature, in prac-
tice, it is rarely the case that the total number of potential bidders is given. Further, if entry to
an auction is endogenous - for example, in our case bidders have to purchase no less than the
required minimum amount in an auction and this can be considered as an implicit entry bar -
the number of active bidders in an sequential auctions becomes stochastic. In light of this, we
develop an entry model where bidders receive their signal before deciding whether to enter the
current auction and the entry decisions are conditioned on their demands. In this sense, our entry
model bears some similarity to the third type of entry models proposed in Li and Zheng (2009),
however, the latter focuses on policy issues in single-object procurement auctions whereas we
are examining multi-unit sequential auctions.
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3.2.2 Agent-based Decision Support
Prior research has shown that software agents offer great promise in assisting humans with their
decision-making efforts (Maes, 1994; Wellman et al., 2007; Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995),
especially in information-rich and time-critical domains (Ketter et al., 2012). Of particular im-
portance to the current work is Adomavicius et al. (2009) where the authors use the theoretical
properties of a given auction mechanism to design strategies for intelligent bidding agents. Us-
ing data generated from a simulation model, they demonstrate that these intelligent agents can
achieve a higher winning probability while retaining a high surplus for bidders.
Although our work shares the general decision-support spirit of Adomavicius et al. (2009),
the two papers differ in several dimensions. For one thing, Adomavicius et al. (2009) has
primarily focused on bidders’ perspective whereas we are interested in optimizing auctioneers’
decisions. For another, Adomavicius et al. (2009) adopts the reduced-form approach to charac-
terize auction process and study price dynamics4 while we begin with the identification of the
underlying distribution of bidders’ valuation using structural econometric approach and then
incorporate the derived structural properties into the optimization of key auction parameters.
Finally, unlike most of the existing literature on agent-based decision support where the
quality of recommendations from agents are often evaluated on simulated data, we are able to
measure the performance of the agents’ key capabilities using a rich real-world dataset. Such
benchmarking is critical to the applicability of software agents in practice.
3.3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
Our dataset contains the auction details of large roses at a major auction site during May and
July, 2011. There are 22 attributes, two of which are the bidders’ real-time decision variables:
price and quantity. The remaining variables can be classified into seven broad categories: (1)
product characteristics (for example, product type, stem length, bundling size, blooming scale,
and quality); (2) transaction timing (date and time); (3) supply-side information which includes
lot size and minimum purchase quantity; (4) the precise market actors (seller identity and buyer
identity); (5) logistics (stems per unit, units per trolley, and number of trolleys); (6) bidding
channel (online or offline); (7) clock specification (for example, clock stand and currency unit).
The particular product we chose to study is Avalanche Rose5, because its total transaction
amount was the largest among the entire assortment, and it was sold steadily throughout the two-
4Here, we are not questioning the applicability of the reduced-form approach, since the set-up in Adomavicius
et al. (2009), to a large extent, is motivated by online B2C auctions where a variety of behavioral factors come into
play.
5Avalanche Rose is considered by high class florists, floral designers and demonstrators as an indispensable
element in exclusive rose arrangements, displays, bouquets and venue decorations.
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month period. In order to rule out potential confounding factors related to flower characteristics
in the structural modeling6, we created a subsample where the flowers on sale were of the same
stem length, bundling size, blooming scale and quality level. This left us with 2754 transactions
made by 222 bidders. In total, 31396 units from 189 lots were auctioned over 63 days.
We first examined the price dynamics during the two-month period using a series of box-
plots. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the price trend as well as the daily price variation. We
can see that over the three-month period, the winning prices exhibited a fairly consistent pat-
tern: first went up gradually and then fell down again. In addition, the average price exhibited
Figure 3.1: Boxplots of daily price variation from 2 May, 2011 to 27 July, 2011.
a clear upward trend right before Mother’s Day (May 8th), and the price varied substantially
during these peak days, for example, the highest price exceeded 1 euro on May 6 whereas on a
regular day the highest price was typically below 80 cent.
A major difference between sequential auctions used in various online B2C auctions and
the ones used in the DFA is that bidders can purchase multiple units in each transaction in the
latter setting. From the modeling perspective, bidders’ purchase quantities serve as good proxy
of their demands. Therefore, we also examined the underlying patterns of bidders’ purchase
quantities.
6Flower characteristics have strong influence on bidders’ participation in the auctions, in order to obtain a good
estimate of the number of potential bidders in the structural modeling, we decided to control the observable product
heterogeneity.
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(a) Histogram of purchase quantities. (b) Histogram of extra purchase quantities.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of bidders’ purchase quantities and extra purchase quantities, i.e., pur-
chase quantities less the corresponding minimum required purchase amount.
Figure 3.2a shows the histogram of bidders’ purchase quantity. We can find that in most
cases bidders purchased less than 20 units in each transaction. Further, we plot the distribution
of bidders’ extra purchase quantities, i.e., purchase quantities subtracted the corresponding min-
imum required purchase quantities in Figure 3.2b. The enormous amount of zeros suggests that
a large portion of bidders only bought the minimum required units. Therefore, it is important
for auctioneers to choose the minimum purchase quantity appropriately as the auction proceeds.
Finally, since previous research shows that bidders in sequential online auctions tend to ex-
hibit forward-looking behavior (Zeithammer, 2006), we analyzed the bidding patterns at both
auction level and day level. At auction level, we found that repeated bidding (winning) hap-
pened in 65 auctions (approximately 18.5% of the total number of auctions) and a total of 35
bidders (approximately 13% of the bidder population under consideration) won multiple times
(mostly twice). Anecdotal evidence7 suggests that repeated bidding in these auctions is not
planned, but a response to new-arriving orders or requests from customers. At day level, we
divided the total time8 for auctioning the particular flower into 10 sub-slots and plotted the
bidding frequency within each sub-slot. It follows from Figure 3.3 that the bidding frequency
(normalized) does not differ much across the 10 sub-slots, meaning that bidders did not delib-
erately postpone their bids towards the end. Given these observations and evidence, we decided
7We conducted several interviews with the auctioneers and buyers in 2011.
8Although the time stamps for auctioning the particular type of flower under consideration varied, for a given
day, the flowers from a given supplier with homogeneous properties were only assigned a single time-slot for
auctioning.
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to not consider forward-looking in the modeling process.
Figure 3.3: Bidding frequency (in percentage) at day-level. The total auction time is divided
into 10 sub-slots, and the bidding frequency within each slot is averaged over 63 days.
3.4 Structural Model
In this section, we first formalize the auction process and present the structural model9. We then
discuss the estimation procedure in detail.
3.4.1 Model Setup
Consider an auction lot consisting of l units. The number of rounds K it takes to reach the end
of the auction varies from a minimum of one, when all units are sold via a single transaction, to a
theoretical maximum of l, when only one unit is sold via each transaction. In other words, K is
endogenous to the auction process. At the beginning of the auction, the clock starts at a price s1
set by the auctioneer, and ticks down until one bidder stops the clock with a bid b1. The winner
then chooses the purchase units q1. If the lot is not exhausted, i.e., q1 < l, the auction proceeds
to the next round with a new starting price, which is equal to the previous winning price plus an
increment c. In other words, we have sj = bj−1 + c for j = 2, . . . , K. Winning price bj in the
j-th round is always between the starting price and the pre-determined reserve price bR, and the
number of units sold, qj , varies from zero (when the price drops below bR) to the total number
9A summary of the notations used in the derivation of the model can be found in Appendix A.
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of available units at the beginning of the j-th round. Further, at the beginning of each round,
the auctioneer determines the minimum purchase quantity mj and we have qj ≥ mj except in
the last round where occasionally the remaining units can be less than the minimum purchase
quantity.
Auctioneer’s Decision Problem.
Given an l-unit auction, the auctioneer’s key decision variables in the j-th round include: (1)
reserve price bR, (2) starting price sj , (3) minimum purchase quantity mj , and (4) clock speed.
Currently, the reserve price is set to a negligibly low value which is fixed over the whole year and
it has almost no impact on bidders’ decisions. The clock speed and the increment c associated
with the starting price are also kept constant. Thus in practice, minimum purchase quantity
mj is the only variable that auctioneers can manipulate to influence the bidding dynamics (e.g.,
the competition level) in a given auction. However, unlike reserve price or clock speed which
has been well studied in the auction literature (Katok and Kwasnica, 2008; Levin and Smith,
1996) the effects of minimum purchase quantity is not nearly as well understood. One of the
aims of this research is to develop a good understanding about the impact of minimum purchase
quantity on bidders’ decision-making through structural econometric analysis.
Bidder’s Decision Problem.
Bidder i’s decision-making process in round j consists of the following steps: (1) decide
whether to participate in the bidding competition, given the minimum purchase quantity mj;
(2) submit10 the bid bij , given that he decided to compete in round j; (3) choose the purchase
quantity qij conditional on the fact that he is the winner of the sub-auction in round j.
Suppose there are N(N > 2) risk-neutral bidders for the current auction. Within the stan-
dard symmetric IPV paradigm, each potential bidder i (i = 1, . . . , N) is assumed to have a
private value vi. Bidder i does not know other bidders’ private values but knows that all pri-
vate values including her own have been drawn11 independently from a common distribution F ,
which is absolutely continuous with density f and support [v, v] ⊂ R+. The equilibrium bid bi
of bidder i is given by:
bi = s(vi, F,N, v) = vi −
∫ vi
v
F (u)N−1du
F (vi)N−1
. (3.1)
10All the bidders who are interested in the current round of auction can submit a bid, however, only the first
(highest) bid gets revealed and recorded, i.e. we don’t observe losing bids.
11Unlike the examples in Paarsch et al. (2006) where bidders are assumed to have decreasing marginal utility
in sequential rounds, we do not differentiate a single bidder’s valuation towards different number of units. That
is, for a given bidder, her unit value of a given product is invariant of her demand. This is because most bidders
in these auctions are buying on behalf of their clients and the products sold via these auctions are not for personal
consumption but quickly resold to different end markets.
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s denotes the equilibrium strategy, which is obtained by solving the first-order differential equa-
tion12:
1 = (vi − s(vi))(N − 1) f(vi)
F (vi)
1
s′(vi)
, (3.2)
with boundary condition s(v) = v.
The equilibrium relation in Equation 3.1 is the basis of structural analysis of auction data.
Specifically, since bi is a function of vi, which is randomly drawn from F , bi is also random,
with a distribution that is uniquely determined by Equation 3.1. A fundamental issue in struc-
tural estimation is whether the unobserved structural elements (e.g., F ) can be identified from
the observables (e.g., bi). In our case, since winning bids are revealed during each round of a
sequential auction, according to Athey and Haile (2002), bidders’ value distribution F is iden-
tifiable.
3.4.2 Estimation of Bidder’s Value Distribution
We adopt the nonparametric estimation method proposed by Guerre et al. (2000) to recover
the distribution of bidders’ valuation from the observed winning bids. The main idea of this
method relies on the observation that the first derivative s′ and the distribution F with its density
f can be eliminated simultaneously from Equation 3.2 by introducing the distribution G of bi
and its corresponding density g. Specifically, for any b ∈ [v, s(v)], G(b) = Pr(B ≤ b) =
Pr(V ≤ s−1(b)) = F (s−1(b)) = F (v). Taking the derivative of G(b) and F (v), we have
g(b) = f(v)/s
′
(v). Therefore, Equation 3.2 can be rewritten as
vi = bi +
1
N − 1
G(bi)
g(bi)
. (3.3)
The nonparametric estimation works in two steps. In the first step, we construct a sample of
pseudo private values based on the kernel estimates of the distribution and density of observed
bids using the relation in Equation 3.3. Then, in the second step, the sample of pseudo values
is used to estimate nonparametrically the density and distribution of bidders’ private values.
This two-step nonparametric method was initially proposed for first-price auctions where all
the submitted bids (winning bids as well as losing bids) are available for the estimation. In
our case, since only winning bids are revealed, the direct application of the above two-step
estimation only gives the distribution and density of the highest values of the bidders, which
need to be further converted to the value distribution of all bidders using order statistics. A
full description of the estimation procedure involving Dutch auctions (i.e., only winning bids
12The first-order condition is derived by maximizing the expected profit under the risk neutrality and symmetric
assumptions.
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are observed) can be found in Paarsch et al. (2006). Below we will provide a sketch of this
procedure.
Let GW denote the cumulative distribution of winning bids. Under the symmetric IPV
paradigm, we have GW (w) = G(w)N . For a random sample of T observations (denoted by
Wt, t = 1, . . . , T ) with identical number of bidders, we can estimate13 GW (w) by
G˜W (w) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1(Wt ≤ w), (3.4)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. The corresponding probability density function of winning
bids gW (w) is then estimated by
g˜W (w) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
h
κ(
Wt − w
h
), (3.5)
where h is a sequence of bandwidth parameters such that h goes to zero and T h goes to infinity
as T goes to infinity. κ(·) is a kernel smoothing function. An important issue with the nonpara-
metric estimation in Equation 3.5 is the trade-off between bias and variances. Here, bandwidth
h is similar as the bin width for histograms and it has a strong influence to the estimation results.
Following the rule of thumb suggested by Silverman (1986), we choose h equal to 1.06σT −1/5
where σ is the standard deviation of winning bids. In practice, we can use the sample standard
deviation in lieu of σ.
The valuation of the highest bidder in transaction t can thus be recovered by
V˜(1:N)t = Wt +
N
N − 1
G˜W (Wt)
g˜W (Wt)
. (3.6)
Equation 3.6 can then by used to estimate the distribution function of the highest valuation using
the following relation:
F˜Z(z) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1(V˜(1:N)t ≤ z), (3.7)
and bidders’ value distribution can be estimated by
F˜ (v) = F˜Z(v)
1
N = [
1
T
T∑
t=1
1(V˜(1:N)t ≤ v)] 1N . (3.8)
So far in our estimation process we have implicitly assumed the number of bidders, N , is
known. However, in practice, it is often difficult to determine this number in multi-unit sequen-
tial Dutch auctions. For one thing, only winning bids are observed in Dutch auctions. This is
13In the following, we use a “∼” atop a letter to denote the corresponding estimate.
40
24 Structural Model
fundamentally different from open-cry English auctions or First-price sealed bid auctions. For
another, bidders can easily log in or log out with the current bidding system at any point of an
on-going auction, and not all the bidders who have logged in to the current auction are truly
interested in the products under auction. Instead, some might be collecting market information
and preparing for their bidding in the upcoming auctions by logging in earlier than necessary.
In the following, we will discuss how to tackle the challenge of the estimation of N .
3.4.3 Estimation of the Number of Bidders
In general, there are two approaches to model the number of bidders in an auction: one considers
the number as resulting from an exogenous stochastic process while the other tries to endogenize
bidders’ entry process. We took the second approach by associating a bidder’s participation in
a given auction with her demand. To start with, we first give the definition of an active bidder.
DEFINITION. A bidder is considered to be active in round j if her unfulfilled demand is
equal or larger than the minimum purchase quantity mj .
Let Nj denote the number of active bidders in round j of an auction. We have
E(Nj|mj) = E(
Ntotal∑
i=1
xi,j|mj) (3.9)
where Ntotal is the total number of bidders who have logged in to the auction system and xi,j is
a binary variable defined as follows:
xi,j =
{
0 if Dij < mj,
1 if Dij ≥ mj. (3.10)
Here, Dij stands for Bidder i’s demand in round j. Since most bidders only buy the mini-
mum required units and the empirical distribution of bidders’ extra purchase units (Dij − mj)
is over-dispersed (see Figure 3.2b), Dij − mj is modeled with zero-inflated negative binomial
distribution (Wang and Boutilier, 2003; Winkelmann, 2008):
fZINB(D
i
j −mj) =
{
pii,j + (1− pii,j) · NegBin(Dij −mj) if Dij = mj,
(1− pii,j) · NegBin(Dij −mj) if Dij > mj, (3.11)
where pii,j captures the probability of extra zero counts and NegBin is given by
NegBin(Y = y) =
Γ(y + τ)
y!Γ(τ)
(
τ
λ+ τ
)τ (
λ
λ+ τ
)y, y = 0, 1, . . . ;λ, τ > 0. (3.12)
Γ(·) is the gamma function, τ is a shape parameter which quantifies the amount of over-
dispersion, and λ = E(Y ) , where in our case Y = Dij −mj .
Now the only issue left is how to estimate Ntotal, the total number of potential bidders in the
auctions. We develop an iterative strategy. The general idea is to start with an educated-guess
41
25
of the total number of potential bidders14 and gradually refine it by minimizing the difference
between the distribution of the observed winning bids and the distribution of the induced win-
ning bids generated from the current estimate of the total number of potential bidders, using the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) measure:
DKL(g˜W ||g˜induced) =
∫
g˜W (w) log
g˜W (w)
g˜induced(w)
dw. (3.13)
We conduct simulations to test the effectiveness of such iterative strategy. The results show
that the estimated total number of potential bidders are quite accurate15.
3.5 Empirical Results
Before presenting the empirical results, we would like to briefly discuss the applicability of
the above theoretical framework to the context of the Dutch Flower Auctions. First of all,
according to Milgrom and Weber (1982a), the IPV framework suits better than the common
value framework in case of nondurable consumer goods such as flowers. In addition, the IPV
paradigm can be justified by the market structure: bidders in the DFA are typically serving
distinct market segments and they come to the auctions with the willingness-to-pay of their
customers. As a matter of fact, most bidders have firm-specific marginal revenue curves, which
lead to the variation of their valuations. Next, the risk neutrality assumption is appropriate
because most bidders do not face strong budget constraints and if they lose an auction, there
are often other lots available on the same day which can serve as close substitutes. Further,
the indifference assumption regarding bidders’ unit value on different amounts is supported by
the fact that bidders are mostly buying on order and the products purchased via the auctions
are not for personal consumption but quickly resold to different end markets. This is quite
different from B2C context where bidders with multi-unit demand in sequential auctions are
often assumed to have decreasing marginal utility.
3.5.1 Estimation of Structural Model
Using the transaction data described above, we recovered the distribution of bidders’ valuation.
The cumulative distribution functions under various minimum purchase quantities are presented
in Figure 3.4. Although there seems to be a slightly higher percentage of low-valuation bidders
(valuation between 0 and 0.3) when minimum purchase quantity is set to 1, overall, the three es-
timated distributions are quite similar. In other words, the potential demand heterogeneity does
14A possible choice can be the average number of winning bidders for the given flower on a daily basis.
15The details of the simulation-based test can be found in Appendix B.
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not seem to lead to considerable differences in bidders’ value distribution. This also suggests
that the way we used to model bidders’ decision-making process is appropriate.
Figure 3.4: Estimated distribution functions of bidders’ valuations on Avalanche Rose.
Another important observation from Figure 3.4 is that a large percentage of logged-in bid-
ders’ valuation is below zero, meaning they are not truly interested in the current (sub) auctions
they have logged in to. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence we have acquired from
the onsite interviews at the flower auctions as well as the previous findings by Van den Berg and
van der Klaauw (2007) - while the average number of bidders registered during an auction was
around 50, only 5-7 bidders were actually participating in the bidding.
We also compared the estimated bid functions under different required minimum purchase
units. The results can be seen from Figure 3.5. Here, the main observations are: 1) bidders
shade their bids considerably below their valuations in all three cases; 2) bidders with higher
valuations shade more than low valuation bidders; 3) bidders tend to bid more aggressively
when minimum purchase quantity is set to one. A possible explanation to the expected bid
increase under low minimum purchase quantity is that bidders would face tougher competition
and higher uncertainty on future supply (Jeitschko, 1998), since a low minimum purchase
quantity attracts more bidders to participate in the bidding and opens more possibilities.
By explicitly recovering the distribution of bidders’ valuations and bid functions, we can
simulate auction results under alternative auction designs and compare the performance of dif-
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Figure 3.5: Estimated bidding functions.
ferent designs. In the following, we will discuss the policy simulation on different choices of
minimum purchase quantities.
3.5.2 Robustness Check
One of the main concerns when applying the structural estimation to empirical context is that
bidders tend to deviate from the equilibrium strategies (see Ariely and Simonson (2003) for
example) thus the implications from the estimation results might be misleading. In order to
investigate the impact of potential behavioral “noises”, we re-run the structural estimation by
introducing measurement errors in the data generating process.
In particular, we posit that the observed winning bids consists of two parts which are inde-
pendent from each other: the expected willingness-to-pay which is determined by the bidding
strategy and a bidder’s value, and the error term16. Thus for a random sample of T observations
Wt, (t = 1, . . . , T ), we have
Wt = Bt + εt(Rt), t = 1, . . . , T , (3.14)
where Bt denotes the expected or planned bid and εt(Rt) is the error term which captures the
16The independent assumption is used as a standard condition in most of the additive error models
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aggregated effect of unobserved behavioral factors. We allows for heteroscedastic contamina-
tion in Equation 3.14, i.e., each error term can have its own density function.
Let fW (·) denotes the density of observed winning bids (contaminated with behavioral
noises), g(·) the density of expected bids, and fR(·) the density of error term. Under the in-
dependence assumption,
fW (w) =
∫
g(b)fR(w − b)db. (3.15)
The estimation of g(·) without imposing any parametric assumption is often referred as decon-
volution problem (Krasnokutskaya, 2011). In general, when fW and fR are known, g(·) can be
recovered by Fourier inversion17.
To test the robustness of the structural estimation results in Section 3.5.1, we conduct simu-
lation experiment where we assume the error term follows normal distribution, i.e.,
ε(Rt) ∼ N (0, [0.01σ ∗ (0.5 +Rt/max(Rt))]2). (3.16)
Here σ controls the magnitude of the noises. Since in the current system it takes 36 millisec-
onds for the clock to go down by 1 tick and the average human reaction time is around 200
milliseconds, we set σ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 in the experiment. Further, in order to deal with the
heteroscedasticity in the errors, we use the kernel density estimator proposed by Delaigle and
Meister (2008) to recover the density function of expected (planned) bids before proceeding to
the structural estimation procedure described in Section 3.4.2. The final estimation results can
be seen in Figure 3.6.
(a) Min. purchase quantity=1 (b) Min. purchase quantity=3 (c) Min. purchase quantity=5
Figure 3.6: Estimated value distribution functions when considering behavioral noises in the
bidding process.
We can find that when minimum purchase quantity is set low (e.g., 1 or 3), the estimated
value distribution is quite robust to behavioral noises. In fact, according to Figure 3.6a and
17For details of the derivation, see Appendix C.
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Figure 3.6b, the estimated value distributions for the cases when we introduce behavioral noises
in the bidding process are almost the same as the original one when we do not consider errors
in the data generating process. On the other hand, when the minimum purchase quantity is
increased to 5, which means the number of active bidders for the current auction is decreased,
the estimated distributions are quite different under the purely rational setting where bidders
follow equilibrium strategy and the highly noisy setting where bidders considerably deviate
from the equilibrium strategy (e.g., σ = 5). In fact, we might overestimate the percentage of
low-value bidders by almost 6%.
Overall, the simulation test shows that the results from our structural estimation is quite
robust against behavioral noises, i.e., even if bidders are not strictly following the equilibrium
strategy and the observed winning bids are contaminated by some unobserved factors, the es-
timated value distribution is still reliable. However, when the bidding process is subject to
significant shocks, the estimation results might be problematic. A full treatment of this issue is
out of the scope of this paper and we shall leave it as future work.
3.5.3 Policy Simulation
As we have already seen, minimum purchase quantity has a strong impact on the bidding dy-
namics. On one hand, bidders use the specific minimum purchase quantity in each round as
an external reference point when determining their purchase quantities, and they are inclined
to purchase the exact amount of minimum required units. Thus increasing minimum purchase
quantity is often considered to be an effective way to speed up the auction process. On the other
hand, a large minimum purchase quantity might deter potential bidders’ entry to an auction and
thus leads to less competition and low price. Currently, auctioneers mainly rely on their intu-
ition and experience to decide the minimum purchase quantity in each round. Typically, they
set a relatively low minimum purchase quantity at the beginning and gradually increase it as
the auction proceeds. Empirically, it is important to find out whether such rule-of-thumb yields
desirable outcomes.
With the estimated value distribution, we can simulate auction results under different de-
signs. Therefore, we compared the expected total revenue and market clearing speed, which is
measured by the number of rounds needed to finish the given auctions, of two alternative designs
where the minimum purchase quantities are set in different ways – 1) fixed design where the
minimum purchase quantity is always set to 1; 2) heuristic design where the minimum purchase
quantity is monotonically increasing as 1, 1, 2, 2, . . . , and so on – with the observed design
(benchmark). For each of the alternative designs, we first simulated bidders’ private values and
demands from the estimated distributions. For a given minimum purchase quantity, we then
used the estimated bidding function to generate the winning bid and purchase quantity. Such
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simulation process is repeated for 50 times. The mean and standard deviation of total revenue
and number of rounds corresponding to each design are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison of the performance of different auction designs.
Total Revenue (in Euro) Number of Rounds
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Observed Design (Benchmark) 589,231 - 2,754 -
Fixed Design 737,471 2,637 3,605 144
Heuristic Design 624,909 2,465 2,682 21
According to Table 3.1, the observed design is neither best in terms of maximizing total rev-
enue nor increasing market-clearing speed. The fixed design outperforms the observed design
substantially in terms of revenue maximization: the expected total revenues from both designs
are 25 percent higher than the observed design. However, such improvement comes at an ex-
tremely high cost in terms of market clearing speed: the expected number of rounds taken to
finish the auctions increased by 31 percent. Given the tight daily auction schedule and high
operation costs, such extended auction time is not acceptable. On the other hand, the heuristic
design indeed shows improvement on market-clearing speed: the expected number of rounds
taken to finish the auctions reduces by approximately 3 percent. Further, to our surprise, the
expected total revenue from the heuristic design is 6 percent higher than the observed design18.
This suggests that there is ample room to improve the way of setting minimum purchase quan-
tities in the sequential rounds.
3.5.4 Dynamic Optimization of Key Auction Parameters
Due to cognitive and computational limitations, auctioneers cannot process all the informa-
tion in the market fast enough to make informed decisions on the key auction parameters. A
promising way to address these limitations is to augment auctioneers’ capabilities with high-
performance decision support tools in the form of software agents (Wooldridge and Jennings,
1995). In order to provide effective decision support, these agents shall be able to: (i) make
good predictions of future auction states (e.g., the winning prices and purchase quantities in the
upcoming auctions as well as the market trends); and (ii) optimizing the key auction parameters
based on the predictions. In the following, we will discuss how to apply the structural analysis
in the dynamic prediction and optimization of key auction parameters, using the example of
minimum purchase quantity.
18The t-test shows that the difference is significant (p-value < 0.001).
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Structural-based Prediction.
In general, two different approaches have been used in prediction tasks arising from auctions:
the reduced-form approach and the structural-based approach. The reduced-form approach aims
to characterize bidding dynamics and winning prices using a set of observable variables and the
main advantage of this approach is that it can effectively adapt the prediction to the market
dynamics. The structural approach, on the other hand, attempts to map the observed bids to
bidder’s valuation and then use the equilibrium bid functions to make predictions. Therefore,
it has the advantage of being able to predict the effect of policy changes (e.g., adjustments of
minimum purchase quantities). Further, since the structural-based approach can provide nor-
mative insights into the auction process itself, the predictions often have better interpretations.
However, a key question associated with the structural-based prediction is: how to ensure that
the estimated valuation distribution is relevant to the upcoming auctions?
We propose to take a middle path which combines the strengths of the pure reduced-form
approach and the pure structural approach by using the most relevant transaction data to estimate
the current distribution of bidders’ valuations. This means that the pool of training data shall be
updated continuously such that the latest transaction data is added while the earliest transaction
data is discarded. Further, transactions included in the pool shall be weighted in a way that
reflects their relative importance, that is, the more recent the transaction is, the higher weight it
gets. This is because the recent transactions are usually more informative in reflecting market
trend, especially during highly volatile period. Figure 3.7 provides an illustration of the dynamic
training pool where the darker shaded areas indicate transactions with higher weights.
Figure 3.7: A schematic representation of the dynamic training pool. Each instance in the
training set is weighted exponentially with respect to its recency.
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In order to test the performance of our prediction method, we split the original dataset into
two parts: the first 2/3 transactions as the initial training set and the rest 1/3 transactions as the
test set. The training data is used to recover the distribution of bidders’ valuation and predict
winning prices in the upcoming auctions. After obtaining the predicted winning price in the
upcoming transaction, the true observation of this transaction will be added to the training pool
while the earliest observation from the training pool is removed. Therefore, the total amount of
transactions used for prediction is constant during the whole procedure. The transactions in the
training pool are weighted exponentially according to their recency.
We compared the observed distribution of winning bids on the test set with the estimations
from the above dynamic prediction method and static method where the prediction is solely
based on the original 2/3 transaction data. It follows from Figure 3.8 that although both the
static and dynamic prediction methods somehow overestimate the proportion of low winning
bid between 0 and 0.2, the estimated distribution resulting from the dynamic prediction method
shows better fit with the observed distribution. We also performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(K-S test) to compare the two estimated distributions and the empirical distribution. For the
static model, the resulting p-value is less than 0.01, suggesting the estimated distribution from
static model is significantly different from the observed distribution. On the contrary, for the
dynamic model, p-value from the K-S test is larger than 0.1. Thus we can conclude that the
structural-based dynamic method yields quite accurate prediction.
Figure 3.8: The distributions of observed winning prices and predicted winning prices on the
test data.
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Optimization by Dynamic Programming.
We use dynamic programming to determine the optimal minimum purchase quantities in the se-
quential rounds. Dynamic programming (Bellman, 1957) refers to a useful algorithmic paradigm
where a complicated problem is solved by breaking it down into a collection of simpler sub-
problems recursively and tackling them one by one. It ensures the global optimality of the
solution and allows for hard constraints to be imposed in a natural and straightforward struc-
ture. In our case, the auctioneers’ problem is formulated as:
arg max
mj
E(
K∑
j=1
BjQj − φ(K)|mj), (3.17a)
Subject to
K∑
j=1
Qj ≤ L, (3.17b)
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, Qj ≥ mj. (3.17c)
Here, φ(K) is the penalty function depending on the total number of rounds. Although we do
not know the exact operational cost associated with the duration of an auction or total number
of rounds taken, the fixed cost bidders need to pay for each transaction19 can be considered
as a type of compensation for the marginal operational cost per round. Therefore, we use a
linear model to characterize the penalty term in Equation 3.17a, that is, φ(K) = ϕ · K and
we experiment with different choices of ϕ. Further, since the minimum purchase quantity in
the previous rounds can influence both the winning bid and purchase quantity in the current
round, we choose backward induction (Adda and Cooper, 2002; Puterman, 2009) to solve the
optimization problem defined by Equation 3.17a-3.17c.
Using the same simulation procedure as in the study of policy counterfactuals, we compared
the performance of optimized designs (under different penalty settings) with the observed de-
sign on the test set. It follows from Table 3.2 that the optimized design without penalty yields
considerably higher revenue, although such improvement comes at a high cost of market clear-
ing speed. Such observation is consistent with the results in Table. On the other hand, if the
penalty term is set appropriately, the dynamic optimization can lead to significant improvement
on the expected revenue at a negligible cost of market clearing speed. For example in our case,
when ϕ is set to 2, the expected revenue increases by 12 percent whereas the number of rounds
needed for the given auctions almost stays the same.
In addition, since the auctions operate at a high speed (i.e., each transaction takes 3 to 5
seconds), the optimization of minimum purchase quantities must be completed efficiently or
19During our interview at a major auction site, we have learned from the auctioneers that bidders need to pay a
fixed cost for each transaction, unless she bought the total available amount or a whole trolley of products.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of performance between the observed design and optimized designs.
Total Revenue (in Euro) Number of Rounds
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Observed Design (Benchmark) 180,387 - 1,053 -
Optimized Design (ϕ = 0) 211,017 2,441 1,204 36
Optimized Design (ϕ = 1) 210,367 1,771 1,160 24
Optimized Design (ϕ = 2) 202,805 2,816 1,094 28
Optimized Design (ϕ = 3) 170,649 2,803 919 16
even in real-time. Fortunately, during our simulation experiment, we found that the average
calculation time for the minimum purchase quantity in the upcoming round is approximately .5
seconds20. This suggests that our proposed optimization approach is indeed applicable to the
real-world auctions.
Finally, we would like to point out that our optimization approach is also very flexible. For
example, auctioneers can leverage their experience to tailor the choices of penalty function to
the specific market conditions or market regimes (Ketter et al., 2012). This, however, imposes
extra requirements to the software agents - they shall be able to communicate with the users in
an effective and efficient manner, or learn about the users’ preferences and requirements in a
non-intrusive way (Bichler et al., 2010). A full treatment of these design issues is beyond the
scope of this paper, and we will leave it to future work.
3.6 Conclusion
We developed a structural model for multi-unit sequential Dutch auctions in a complex B2B
context where auctioning and bidding decisions have to be made within a few seconds. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly models the sequential aspects of
these complex auctions using structural analysis. Further, we used the structural model to study
policy counterfactuals and evaluate the performance of alternative auction designs. Previous
studies have shown that bidders in real-world auctions often exhibit unexpected behavior and
deviate from the theoretical prediction. Although a deep understanding of the behavioral aspects
in the competitive bidding process will require much more empirical work, the findings from
our current research provide a normative benchmark against which alternative designs can be
assessed appropriately.
From the managerial perspective, our research provides valuable insights to the practition-
ers, especially the auctioneers, in their decision-making concerning the key auction parameters.
20The simulations were run on an Intel i5, 2.5 GHz machine with 4G of RAM and Windows 2007.
51
35
As Klemperer (1999) pointed out, “auction design is not one size fits all.” In the case of the
Dutch Flower Auctions, we have shown that choices of minimum purchase quantities must be
tailored to the local circumstances, especially the current market conditions. For example, in
order to push more products to the market on peak days such as Valentine’s Day, auctioneers
must speed up the auction process by increasing the penalty associated with the expected num-
ber of transactions when determining the optimal minimum purchase quantities. Although this
might result in a decrease of average revenue per auction, the total revenue can still be increased
due to the accommodation of more auctions in the daily auction schedule. Given the cognitive
and computational limitations of human decision makers, we propose to augment auctioneers’
capabilities by deploying software agents. These agents can assist auctioneers in optimizing the
key auction parameters under different market conditions.
As the next step, we intend to extend our model by taking into account bidder asymmetry
in the auctions. Bidder asymmetries arise for different reasons. For example, even bidders’
valuations are drawn from the same distribution, they might have different preferences or risk
attitudes. Additionally, in sequential auctions, bidders’ subsequent valuations might also be
influenced by the number of units they have won in the past21. Note that structural econometric
analysis becomes much more challenging when we remove the symmetric assumption, because
the system of first-order differential equations that characterizes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
often does not have a closed-form solution and we can only obtain approximate solutions nu-
merically. In order to address these challenges, currently, we are working closely with the
auctioneers to better characterize bidders’ valuations. We are also experimenting with different
numerical methods and conduct realistic simulations.
21In our case, fortunately, bidders are often purchasing on behalf of their clients and they tend to have much
stronger sense of valuation as well as willingness to pay. Hence the valuation during the sequential rounds is less
likely to vary a lot.
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3.A List of Notations
Table 3.3: Summary of notations used in the model
Notation Explanation
l The units of products under auctions
K The number of rounds taken to reach the end of an auction
sj The starting price in round j
bR The reserve price
c The constant incremental added on top of the current-round winning price
mj The required minimum purchase quantity in round j
N Number of bidders
F The cumulative distribution function of bidders’ valuation
f The density function of bidders’ valuation
fW The density function of observed bids contaminated with behavioral noises
fZ The density function of the highest valuation
vi Bidder i’s valuation (independently drawn from the unknown value distribution F )
s The equilibrium strategy
bi Bidder i’s bidding price which depends on vi, N and F
qji Bidder i’s purchase quantity in round j.
Dij Bidder i’s demand in round j
xi,j Binary variable which indicates whether Bidder i is active in round j
G The cumulative distribution function without contamination of behavioral noises
g The density function of observed bids without contamination of behavioral noises
Wt Observation in a random sample of winning bids
3.B Simulation-based Test for the Iterative Method
Assuming bidders’ private values are drawn from a truncated log-normal distribution with µ =
−10 and σ = 5, the required minimum purchase quantities with a Poisson distribution where
µ = 4 and bidders’ extra purchase quantities are characterized by the zero-inflated negative
binomial distribution with pi = 1/3, λ = 1/9, τ = 1.
In each simulation, we generate 10 auctions, each with 50 units of a homogeneous product.
The bidder with the highest bid22 wins the auction and her demand will be fulfilled. This
procedure continues until all the units in the current auction are sold out, and then we move to
the next auction. If the remaining units in the current auction are less than the demanded units
of the winner, the winner takes all the remaining units and will participate in the next auction.
22Here we assume all the bidders adopt the equilibrium strategy.
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We tested the estimation result from the iterative method for different number of potential
bidders. The results are shown in Table 3.4. We can see that
Table 3.4: Results of the simulation-based test.
Estimated Number of Potential Bidders
Actual Number of Potential Bidders Mean Standard Deviation
60 72.15 5.85
70 77.45 5.91
80 82.55 5.61
90 87.40 2.66
100 93.85 3.84
110 102.80 3.58
3.C The Deconvolution Problem
For each random variable X , let ψX(t) denote its characteristic function, i.e.,
E(eitX) =
∫
eitxfX(x)dx. (3.18)
According to Equation 3.15, we have
ψW (t) = ψB(t) · ψε(t). (3.19)
Thus ψB(t) can be derived as a function of series of ψW (t) and ψε(t), and g(b) can be obtained
by applying Fourier inversion to ψB(t), i.e.,
g(b) =
1
2pi
∫
e−itbψB(t)dt. (3.20)
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Chapter 4
Exploring Bidder Heterogeneity in
Sequential B2B Auctions1
4.1 Introduction
The proliferation of online auctions has offered researchers fertile ground to examine practical
auction design and real-life bidding behavior (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Ba and Pavlou, 2002;
Bapna et al., 2004, 2009; Goes et al., 2010; Kauffman and Wood, 2006). Most of the work is,
however, restricted to auction-level outcomes in the business-to-consumer (B2C) sector, charac-
terized by relatively well-understood products such as electronic devices. Comparatively, little
attention has been paid to business-to-business (B2B) auctions which are economically more
significant.
Despite the price discovery nature, there are some key features of B2B auctions that are
different from those of B2C auctions. First, firms typically only engage in exchange activities
with a limited number of partners in B2B markets (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993). As the
result, transactions in B2B markets often involve high-level mutual trust and detailed product
and quality requirements. For example, in B2B procurement auctions, buyers often adopt a
pre-screening process to select the qualified suppliers which will later compete in the bidding
process. Second, bidders in the B2B markets are much more knowledgeable and experienced.
They often participate in these auctions repeatedly over a long period of time and thus know
more about their competitors and the goods they are bidding on. Further, since the vast majority
of goods auctioned in B2B markets are not for bidders’ personal consumption, they also have
1This chapter is based on the conference paper “Exploring Bidder Heterogeneity in B2B Auctions: Evidence
from the Dutch Flower Auctions”, co-authored with Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter and Eric van Heck, and is cur-
rently under review at a top-ranked journal in information systems. The author of this dissertation is the first author
of these papers. We thank the seminar participants at Carlson School of Management, Rotterdam School of Man-
agement, at the Conference on Information Systems and Technology (CIST 2012), and at the Statistical Challenges
in eCommerce Research Symposium (SCECR 2012) for feedback and discussions. The authors acknowledge the
comprehensive support from FloraHolland.
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different incentives as compared to the participants in B2C auctions and thus may pursue dif-
ferent strategies. Third, bidders in B2B auctions are often subject to different levels of budget
constraints (Benoit and Krishna, 2001). To better understand and operationalize the differences
between B2B auctions and those well-studied B2C auctions, Mithas and Jones (2007) suggest
that: “Future research should develop typologies of bidder heterogeneity in the B2B context
similar to those that Bapna et al. (2004) developed in the B2C context.”
Using the world’s largest flower wholesale auction market, namely, the Dutch Flower Auc-
tions (DFA) as the research context, this paper addresses the following research questions:
• What bidding strategies do bidders pursue in B2B markets? Are they similar to the strate-
gies found in B2C markets?
• Can bidders’ choices of bidding strategies be explained by their business constraints such
as budget and demand as well as their bidding channels?
• How do different bidding strategies affect buyers’ economic welfare?
• How can we use the findings to improve the design of B2B markets?
Unlike those well-studied online B2C auctions which predominantly use either the English
auction mechanism or its variation, the DFA uses the Dutch auction mechanism. This means
only the winning bids are revealed. Further, these auctions clear very fast - on average, each
transaction takes four seconds. Given the sheer magnitude and the extreme time pressure, bid-
ding in the DFA is highly challenging even for professional bidders.
Drawing on a unique and extensive data set that contains more than 250,000 transactions
from the DFA, we create four classification variables, three at day-level and one at auction-level
to characterize bidders’ bidding strategies. The use of day level variables is a novel contribution
to the characterization of bidding strategies in B2B markets. Further, since we can track the
identity of bidders over an extended period of time, we also develop an empirical model to
explain bidders’ choices of bidding strategies.
Overall, we find a stable taxonomy which consists of five types of bidding strategies. The
choices of these strategies are associated with bidders’ business profile as well as their demand
and channel adoption and usage. Specifically, our results show that bidders with a high budget
are more likely to adopt opportunistic strategy and bid later in an auction. We also find that
bidders with a large demand (e.g., wholesalers) are more likely to adopt a participator strategy
and actively bidding in the auctions throughout a day. In terms of channel usage, our results
show that bidders using the online channel are more likely to adopt participator and opportunis-
tic strategy rather than evaluator strategy at auction-level, in other words, these online bidders
tend to wait longer in an auction for a good bargain.
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Further, we use a hierarchical linear model to analyze the economic welfare of the identified
bidding strategies. The main finding is that opportunistic strategies perform better than both
participator strategies and evaluator strategies in minimizing the purchasing cost. This result is
different from previous findings in B2C context. Additionally, we also find significant moder-
ating effect of bidding strategies on the impact of auction design parameters. These findings
complement previous studies that have focused on B2C context.
This paper makes several important contributions. It is among the first to characterize the
bidding strategies pursued by professional bidders in B2B markets. While prior research in B2C
context posits that bidders’ bidding strategies converge as they gain experience, we demonstrate
that despite bidders’ extensive experiences, there are theoretically meaningful and empirically
robust clusters of bidding strategies in B2B markets. Using an explanatory model, we map the
identified strategies to bidders’ business profiles, demand and their channel usage. This helps us
to better understand the observed differences in bidding strategies between B2C and B2B mar-
kets. Further, we investigate a single market where electronic (online) and traditional (offline)
channels coexist. This is different from the majority of studies that examines bidders’ bidding
strategies or channel usage. Finally, given the extreme time pressure faced by the bidders in our
empirical context, our findings also sheds new light on real-time decision-making in complex
environment. From the managerial perspective, this paper provides useful implications for the
microstructure design of B2B auction markets. In particular, our finding that bidders tend to
postpone their bidding in the online channel suggests that in order to improve the total revenue
and market clearing speed, auctioneers should strategically disclose and tailor the information
available to bidders in different channels.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the identification of bidding strategies. Section 4 further exam-
ines bidders’ choices of strategies and analyzes the outcomes of different strategies. Section 5
discusses the implications of our findings and concludes with a summary of contributions and
outlines the future work.
4.2 Prior Literature
In this section, we discuss two streams of literature that are closely related to the current study.
4.2.1 Bidder Heterogeneity
Traditionally, auctions have been studied largely from the game-theoretic perspective. Bidders
are assumed to be homogeneous who adopt Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy (McAfee and
McMillan, 1987; Milgrom, 1989; Myerson, 1981). While plausible in traditional face-to-face
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auctions, such assumption quickly breaks down in online context (Ariely and Simonson, 2003;
Bajari and Hortac¸su, 2004). This highlights the necessity of studies addressing the gap between
the behavioral reality and the predictions from classical theory.
Over the past decades, some researchers have pursued more accurate models to explain
the real-life bidding behavior. For example, Carare and Rothkopf (2005) developed theoreti-
cal models of the effect of transaction costs on the winning bids in Dutch auctions. Park and
Bradlow (2005) incorporated four key components of the bidding process (whether people bid
at an auction, who bid, when they bid and how much they bid in the auction) in their inte-
grated model for the bidding behavior in an online auction of notebooks. Others have adopted
a data-driven, inductive approach to ”understand why real bidders do the things that they do”
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2000). For example, using a rich data set from Yankee auctions, Bapna
et al. (2004) identified five types of bidding strategies which are associated with different win-
ning likelihoods and consumer surplus. The authors also demonstrated how to use such bidder
taxonomy to guide the development of user-centric bidding agents and facilitate real-time auc-
tion calibration. More recently, Goes et al. (2012) extended the research on bidder taxonomy to
sequential auctions where bidders have the opportunity to participate in multiple auctions and
thus to learn from past experience. They found that bidders’ choices of bidding strategies are
contingent on their demand, participation experience and auction design parameters.
Currently, most of the empirical work on bidder behavior is exclusively focused on B2C
auctions. Note that the vast majority of transactions in B2C domain are associated with pur-
chases for personal consumption, which often involve questionable assessment of valuation
and, thereby, willingness-to-pay. Additionally, bidders’ participation experience in these auc-
tions can vary a lot. Thus a natural question is whether the observed heterogeneity in the B2C
auctions will disappear when bidders have a strong sense of willingness-to-pay and have gained
sufficient experience, or in other words, whether bidders’ strategies will converge if they repeat-
edly participate in these auctions. Besides its theoretical importance, the answer to this question
has also practical implications to auction design.
In this study, we draw upon a unique B2B context where professional bidders compete in
multiple sequential auctions repeatedly on a daily basis. Compared to the participants in B2C
auctions, these bidders are much more knowledgeable and experienced. Therefore, examining
their bidding patterns can help us to better understand the discrepancy between the observed
real-life bidding behavior and the predicted behavior in auction theory.
4.2.2 Market Channels
The increasing use of the Internet has fueled the adoption of online (electronic) channels in
many markets (Kambil and van Heck, 1998; Kuruzovich et al., 2008; Overby and Jap, 2009).
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Compared to traditional offline channels, the online channels offer many benefits to both buyers
and sellers. For buyers, they can significantly reduce search costs (Bakos, 1997) and switching
costs (Devaraj et al., 2006). For sellers, they greatly increase the market reach and reduce the
transaction cost (Kambil and van Heck, 1998).
Despite these advantages, however, the inherent information asymmetry between buyers and
sellers in the online channels may result in undesirable outcomes. For example, Dewan and
Hsu (2004) find a significant adverse selection discount, i.e., roughly 10-15% of the value of the
goods, on eBay. In a more recent study, Ghose (2009) empirically shows that the information
asymmetry problem persists in online markets despite the presence of signaling mechanisms
such as reputation systems and product condition disclosures.
Given such trade-off, researchers have studied multiple factors that may influence buyer
and seller’s channel choice – i.e., whether to use online, offline, or multiple channels. Using
an extensive panel data that consists of sales event of used vehicles for over a 2.5-year period,
Overby and Jap (2009) find that transactions involving low quality uncertainty are more likely
to occur in the online channels, whereas those involving high quality uncertainty occur more in
the traditional offline channels. As opposed to earlier work, they also examine the interdepen-
dencies between buyers and sellers in the market and illustrate that one party’s use of online
channels influences the other.
In the current study, we do not look into bidders’ choices of participation channel in the
particular B2B auction market. Instead, we focus on bidders’ behavioral characteristics across
different channels, e.g., whether bidders who participate in the auctions via the online channel
are more likely to adopt certain strategies. A comprehensive understanding of bidding strate-
gies across different market channels is critical to the development of effective information
revelation policies (Arora et al., 2007) in multi-channel markets.
4.3 Identification of Bidding Strategies
In this section, we begin with a description of the general characteristics of the data set. We
then discuss the classification method and the empirical findings.
4.3.1 Data
Our data set contains transaction details of roses from June 1 to September 30, 2010 at a major
auction site where screen (image) auctioning has been implemented. This means, bidders are
not shown the actual flowers during the auctions (even they are physically present in the auction
hall); instead, they observe a generic picture for that type of flower together with some specific
product characteristics of that particular lot below the auction clock. Prior research has shown
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that the use of screen auctioning leads to lower prices due to the reduced product quality infor-
mation (Koppius et al., 2004). However, since both the online and offline bidders receive the
same product information, the effect of screen auctioning is not relevant in our study.
In total, we have 280,945 transactions from 38,848 lots2. 593 bidders participated in these
auctions, of which 288 bidders have adopted the online channel. In order to control for the
pre-screening effects related to product category or quality, we created a sub-sample where the
products were homogeneous with respect to their key characteristics. The particular product we
chose is Avalanche Rose, because its total transaction amount was the largest among the entire
assortment, and it was sold steadily throughout the four months. After the sanity check3, we
are left with a total of 8384 transactions from 998 auctions. The number of bidders participated
in these auctions also reduces from the original 593 to 455. Nevertheless, the new data set is
still rich enough for us to explore the bidding strategies pursued in these complex, sequential
auctions. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics. We can see that there is
high variability in lot size, winning price and purchase quantity.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the sub-sample.
Statistic
Number of
Auctions per
Day
Bidders
per
Auction
Number of Auctions
a Bidder Participates
per Day
Lot
Size
Winning
Price
(cent)
Purchase
Quantity
Mean 11.34 8.26 1.24 80.85 36.69 9.62
Median 11.00 7.00 1.00 72.00 37.00 6.00
Standard Deviation 1.99 5.72 0.54 59.95 13.39 13.94
Skewness 0.62 0.79 2.64 1.33 0.15 6.69
Minimum 8.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 7.00 1.00
Maximum 18.00 34.00 6.00 342.00 75.00 311.00
We also examined the price dynamics during the four-month period using a series of box-
plots. Figure 4.1 illustrates the daily price variation as well as the price trend. Despite the
homogeneity of the auctioned products, the transaction prices can still vary a lot even on the
same day. Also, the periodic pattern of the daily average price suggests that there might be
external market forces. In Section 4.4, we will discuss the possible explanations for the price
variation.
2A lot is a bundle of homogenous products. The size of a lot can vary from a few units to more than a hundred
units, and each unit consists of 20 to 80 stems, depending on the type and quality of flower.
3There might be log-in errors in the recorded transactions. For example, in some cases, winning prices were
recorded as zero which clearly indicates an error.
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Figure 4.1: Price variation of roses during June 1 and September 30, 2010.
4.3.2 Cluster Analysis and Results
We use cluster analysis to explore the structural differences in bidders’ bidding strategies. How-
ever, unlike previous studies (e.g., Bapna et al. 2004; Goes et al. 2012), in the DFA, we cannot
observe when a bidder enters an auction, drops out from an auction, or the number of non-
winning bids submitted to an auction, because at any moment of these auctions, only winning
bids (winners’ identities as well as their purchase quantities and winning prices) are revealed.
To deal with this challenge, we create four proxy variables to characterize bidders’ behavior
- Time of Entry in an Auction, Time of Entry and Time of Exit on a Day, and Frequency of
Bid on a Day - using the rich transaction data which captures each bidder’s winning bids across
different auctions. Note that the introduction of the day-level variables is a novel contribution
to the identification of bidding strategies in B2B markets. Given that bidders are participating
in these auctions on a day-to-day basis, the day-level variables can help us to better relate
the observed bidding behavior with the market conditions as well as the business profiles of
different bidders. In the following, we will describe how we construct and operationalize each
of these proxy variables.
Time of Entry in an Auction (TOE-A). During an auction, one of the key decisions for the
bidders is to decide when to press the button. If it is too early, the bidder may end up paying a
higher price than necessary, whereas reacting too slow may result in forgoing the opportunity
to obtain the auctioned product. Since the DFA operate in a multi-unit sequential manner, each
auction often consists of multiple rounds, although neither the bidders nor the auctioneers know
a priori how many rounds it will take to finish the current auction. To account for the variability
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of the length of an auction, we define a bidder’s time of entry in a given auction as the ranking
of the sub-auction where the bidder wins. For instance, if a bidder placed his bid in the second
round and the entire lot takes ten rounds to finish, the TOE-A for this bidder in that specific
auction is 2/10 = 0.2. Since bidders often participate in many auctions on a given day, we take
the average of a bidders’s TOE-As across different auctions as his overall TOE-A on that day.
Time of Entry on a Day (TOE-D). Typically, there are multiple auctions for the same type
of flowers on a day. Some bidders might act as observers in the first few auctions in order to
learn about the market conditions, while others are bidding actively from the very beginning
of an auction day. To capture such behavioral differences, we introduce the day-level proxy,
TOE-D, which is defined as the ranking of the auction where a bidder places his first winning
bid. Suppose there are 6 auctions for the specific flower on a given day, and a bidder’s first
winning bid happens in the 3rd auction, the TOE-D for this bidder is 3/6=0.5.
Time of Exit on a Day (TOX-D). To couple bidder’s entry decisions at day-level, we also
need to look at the time when they drop out from the competition. Given the fact that most
bidders in these auctions are buying on order, including bidder’s time of exit together with their
time of entry on a day can help us to identify more complex bidding patterns. Similar as TOE-D,
we define TOX-D as the ranking of the auction where a bidder places his last winning bid.
Frequency of Bid on a Day (FOB-D). In our case, a bidders’ frequency of bid at day-level
refers to the number of winning bids he has placed on a given day. Different from the bidding
frequency in English auctions which indicates bidders’ involvement in an auction, in our case,
FOB-D captures bidders’ potential hedging behavior. That is, in order to avoid the potential
loss of surplus gained from a sub-optimal bidding decision, some bidders tend to spread the
purchase over multiple auctions even though they can fulfill their total demand in one auction.
We used the above classification variables in K-means clustering to identify the bidding
strategies. A major challenge when applying this method is to determine the number of clusters.
Given the exploratory nature of this research, we repeated K-means clustering with a range of
values of K (Kmin = 2, Kmax = 10). According to the Calinski-Harabasz criterion (Milligan
and Cooper, 1985), the optimal number of clusters is five. Note that good scores on an internal
criterion (e.g., Calinski-Harabasz criterion) do not necessarily translate into the effectiveness
of K-means clustering. An alternative is to look at the interpretability of the clustering results,
which is often referred to as “external validity.” In our case, we used ANOVA to test whether
there are significant differences among the cluster centroids. The results from Table 4.2 show
that all the four classification variables are significant.
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Table 4.2: Cluster result ANOVA.
Cluster Attribute Cluster Mean Square Error Mean Square F Mean Square Sig.
TOE-A 88.855 0.022 3967.964 0.000***
TOE-D 97.418 0.021 4650.953 0.000***
TOX-D 100.998 0.022 4642.803 0.000***
FOB-D 30.955 0.014 2265.796 0.000***
Additionally, we conducted robustness test on the clustering results using cross validation.
Specifically, we randomly split the observations into two parts. We applied K-means clustering
(K = 5) to 2/3 of the observations (training data) and then using the identified cluster centers
to label the rest 1/3 of the observations (test data). We then checked whether the labels of the
test data are the same as the original ones obtained by running K-means clustering on the entire
data. We repeated such process by 100 times and found that 99.27% of the observations from
the test data have the same label as before. This shows that our clustering results are very stable.
We label the five clusters identified by K-means based on the characteristics conveyed by
the corresponding centroid. Table 4.3 provides an overview of each cluster.
Table 4.3: Descriptives of the bidder clusters.
Clusters/Strategy Bidders Adopting the Strategy Mean (Std.) of Classification VariablesCases % TOE-A TOE-D TOX-D FOB-D
Conservative Strategies
Early Evaluators (EE-C) 1578 23.70 0.30(0.14) 0.27(0.13) 0.28(0.14) 0.32(0.10)
Opportunists (O-C) 1455 21.80 0.79(0.14) 0.27(0.13) 0.28(0.14) 0.32(0.10)
Participators (P-C) 833 12.50 0.57(0.19) 0.28(0.16) 0.76(0.18) 0.73(0.19)
Forward-looking Strategies
Early Evaluators (EE-F) 1388 20.80 0.31(0.14) 0.76(0.15) 0.77(0.15) 0.33(0.11)
Opportunists (O-F) 1411 21.20 0.81(0.14) 0.76(0.15) 0.78(0.15) 0.33(0.11)
To begin with, the first three clusters take a small mean value (approximately 0.3) in the
dimension of TOE-D, and the rest two clusters take a large mean value (0.76 and 0.78, respec-
tively) in the same dimension. A small value of TOE-D can be interpreted as a high bidding
urgency, which might result from pre-committed orders, whereas a large value of TOE-D in-
dicates considerable time and effort spent on monitoring and information collection prior to
the first winning bids. In light of this, we label the strategies with small values of TOE-D as
conservative and those with large values as forward-looking.
Further, the mean value of TOE-A across different clusters is also quite informative: early
evaluators tend to place winning bids early in an auction, whereas opportunists tend to wait
longer in an auction. Finally, the mean value of FOB-D for all clusters but participators is
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approximately 0.3. Recall that the median of the number of auctions a bidder participates on a
day is one (see Table 4.1). This suggests that participators on average won in more than two
auctions on any given day. Overall, the five clusters identified by the K-means algorithm have
a very straightforward interpretation in our sequential B2B auction context.
Given that all the bidders in this market are professional ones with sufficient bidding experi-
ence, the existence of these distinctive bidding strategies to a large extent challenges the popular
conjecture that bidders’ strategies will converge as they gain experience (Goes et al., 2012). In
the following, we try to understand the observed heterogeneity by examining the antecedents
and consequences of bidders’ strategic choices.
4.4 Understanding Bidding Strategies
In this section, we first discuss the factors that affect bidders’ choices of daily bidding strategies.
We then analyze the outcomes associated with different bidding strategies and examine the
potential interaction between the strategic factors and auction design parameters such as lot size
and minimum purchase quantity.
4.4.1 Bidders’ Choices of Bidding Strategies
Previous research has found a variety of economic, psychological and social factors that can af-
fect bidders’ decisions, although in many cases it is difficult to quantify these factors (Chakravarti
et al., 2002). Given that bidders in the DFA are very familiar with the specific economic set-
ting, we argue that they are less susceptible to psychological and social factors such as herding
bias (Dholakia and Sotysinski, 2001) or addition to excitement (Herschlag and Zwick, 2000).
Thus we focus on the economic factors. In particular, we examine three antecedents that are
potentially critical to bidders’ strategic decisions in the DFA: budget constraint, demand and
transaction cost.
Budget Constraint
Budget constraints are an important feature of real-world B2B auctions. Previous research in
the context of privatization of high-value public goods (e.g., standard treasury, spectrum or
electricity auctions) has shown that in the presence of budget constraints, the conclusion of
the revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds (Che and Gale, 2000; Laffont and Robert,
1996). When multiple objects are auctioned, Benoit and Krishna (2001) point out that it may
be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object to raise the price paid by his
rivals and deplete their budgets so that the second object could be obtained at lower prices.
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In the case of the DFA, bidders are also facing implicit or explicit budget constraints4. Fol-
lowing the above rationale, bidders with a high budget constraint (e.g., those small, family-run
florists) would bid later on a day, in the hope that those who already fulfilled their demand or
consumed their budget in earlier auctions drop out from the market. Additionally, unlike the
classical setting of multi-unit auctions where only one unit is sold in each round, bidders’ pur-
chase quantity in the DFA have to meet the minimum required amount. Currently, auctioneers
usually start with a low minimum purchase quantity at the beginning of an auction and grad-
ually increase it as the auction proceeds. This means if a bidder with a high budget constraint
misses the first few rounds of an auction, he might not be able to afford purchasing the products
in that auction any more. Given these considerations, we hypothesize that
H1a: bidders with a high budget constraint are more likely to choose evaluator strategies over
opportunistic strategies.
H1b: bidders with a high budget constraint are more likely to choose forward-looking, evalua-
tor strategies than conservative, evaluator strategies.
Demand
Bidders in the DFA have, in general, multi-unit demand for any given type of flower. Such
demand might be order-driven or speculation-based, i.e., some bidders are mainly purchasing
on orders while others might decide to purchase more if they expect a “hot” market for certain
flowers5. In the former case, bidders receive a commission fee which varies from 10 to 15
percent of the purchase price. Therefore, they are less likely to shade their bids or reduce the
demand (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000), but bidding aggressively
to make sure they acquire the products ordered by their customers.
On the other hand, if bidders have a large speculation-based demand, they might prefer to
postpone their bidding in the first few rounds to learn the market conditions and trends (Jeitschko,
1998) or wait for a good bargain. Further, given that there are often multiple auctions with
closely substitutable products, they may spread the demand over several auctions to maximize
their expected payoff6. Therefore, we hypothesize that
H2a: bidders are more likely to choose opportunistic strategies over evaluator strategies when
4While the small buyers (e.g., small florists) are often facing hard constraint on borrowing or liquidity, it is
less clear for those large buyers (e.g., international exporters). Sometimes, the choice of a budget itself is in
itself a strategic decision. Nevertheless, drawing on the previous studies, we assume that budget constraints are
endogenously determined prior to the start of an auction day.
5For example, most of the wholesalers tend to buy a lot more roses of high quality than their customers re-
quested before Valentine’s Day.
6This is also referred as modified demand reduction (Goes et al., 2010).
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they have a large demand.
H2b: bidders are more likely to choose participator strategies over the evaluator strategies
when they have a large demand.
Transaction Cost
Bidders’ transaction costs refer to the time and effort invested by bidders in gathering infor-
mation, preparing bids and participating in an auction. Carare and Rothkopf (2005) argue that
bidders incur incremental transaction costs if they delay bidding in slow Dutch auctions. In the
context of the DFA, although each transaction takes only a few seconds, monitoring the market
dynamics is still very time-consuming, especially if the bidder has to be physically present in the
auction hall. As we discussed before, the introduction of the online bidding channel, namely,
KOA, has greatly reduce bidders’ search cost and enhanced their monitoring capabilities. In
other words, bidders who use the online channel incur less transaction cost as those bid via the
traditional offline channel. This rationale leads to our next hypothesis:
H3a: bidders in the online channel are more likely to choose the opportunistic strategies over
evaluator strategies.
H3b: bidders in the online channel are more likely to choose forward-looking, opportunistic
strategies over conservative, opportunistic strategies.
Analysis and Results
We use multinomial logistic regression (MNL) to test the above hypotheses. The unit of
analysis is bidder’s strategy on a given day. MNL generalizes logistic regression to multi-
classes (Greene, 2008). It is used to model the log odds of different outcomes (e.g., member-
ships) of a nominal dependent variable with a linear combination of independent variables. The
main advantage of MNL is that it does not make any assumptions of normality, linearity, or
homogeneity of variance for the independent variables. In our case, the generic model can be
specified as follows:
log(
p(strategy = i)
p(reference strategy)
) = log(β0) + β1,iBudget + β2,iDemand + β3,iKOA, (4.1)
where Budget is a binary variable which takes value 1 if a bidder spent more than e100 pur-
chasing the specific type of flower on a given day and 0 vice versa7, Demand is calculated
7Given that the exact information about bidders’ budget is unknown, we calculate the average of a bidder’s
daily purchase cost and use that as the proxy of his daily budget. The distribution of a bidder’s daily budget is
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by dividing a bidder’s total purchase quantity on a given day over the maximum of his daily
purchase quantity during the four month period, and KOA indicates whether a bidder uses the
online channel (KOA = 1) or not (KOA = 0).
We first set EE-C (conservative, early evaluator strategy) as the reference strategy in Equa-
tion 4.1. Table 4.4 and 4.5 provide the results from likelihood ratio tests. We can find that all
the independent variables as well as their combination have a statistically significant effect on
bidders’ strategic choices.
Table 4.4: Model fitting results.
Criterion Intercept Only MNL Model
AIC 6594.6 5557.4
-2Log-Likelihood 6586.6 5525.4
Table 4.5: Analysis of effects.
Effect Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom Sig.
Intercept 941.8 4 0.000***
Budget 626.7 4 0.000***
Demand 562.9 4 0.000***
KOA 49.3 4 0.000***
We ran the MNL model with different reference strategies and the parameter estimates are
summarized in Table 4.6.
The numbers in Table 4.6 show the marginal change of log odds of choosing the specified
strategy (the row strategy) over the reference strategy (the column strategy) change with respect
to the specific independent variable. For example, we can see that the log odds of a bidder
choosing the strategy O-C over strategy EE-C will increase by 1.14 when the bidder has a
high budget. Similarly, the log odds of a bidder choosing the strategy O-F over strategy EE-F
also increases by 0.99 when he has a high budget. This result supports our hypothesis H1a.
However, it is unclear whether they would choose EE-F over EE-C, since the corresponding
coefficients are insignificant. Thus H1b is not supported. Another observation is that for high-
budget bidders, the log odds for choosing P-C over other strategies increase significantly.
Next, we can see that bidders with a large demand are more likely to choose participator
strategies over opportunistic strategies, which in turn are more likely to be chosen over evaluator
strategies. This result supports H2a and H2b. Further, Table 4.6 shows that online bidders are
right-skewed, with the minimum around e30 and the maximum more than e3000. We take the median, e100, as
the threshold to determine whether a bidder has a large budget or low budget.
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Table 4.6: Parameter estimates.
Strategy Variable
Reference Strategy
Early
Evaluators
(EE-C)
Opportunists
(O-C)
Participators
(P-C)
Early
Evaluators
(EE-F)
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
Opportunists
(O-C)
Intercept -.160***
Budget 1.14***
Demand 1.34***
KOA 0.13
Participators
(P-C)
Intercept -4.42*** -2.82***
Budget 2.59*** 1.45***
Demand 2.90*** 1.56***
KOA 0.21* 0.08
Fo
rw
ar
d-
lo
ok
in
g Early
Evaluators
(EE-F)
Intercept -0.24* 1.36*** 4.18***
Budget 0.15 -0.99*** -2.44***
Demand 0.18 -1.16*** -2.72***
KOA -0.15 -0.28*** -0.36***
Opportunists
(O-F)
Intercept -1.66*** -0.06 2.76*** -1.42***
Budget 1.13*** 0.00 -1.45*** 0.99***
Demand 1.17*** -0.17 -1.73*** 0.99***
KOA 0.38*** 0.24*** 0.17 0.52***
more likely to choose opportunistic strategies over evaluator strategies, and forward-looking
opportunistic strategies over conservative opportunistic strategies. Therefore, both H3a and
H3b are supported.
Finally, given the current results in Table 4.6, we cannot tell whether an online bidder would
choose the participator strategy or opportunistic strategy, with all other conditions being equal.
Table 4.7 summarizes the findings of our hypothesis testing.
So far, we have shown that bidders’ budget constraint, demand and channel usage (which
is closely related to their transaction cost) have significant effect on their choices of bidding
strategies. In the following, we will analyze the outcomes resulting from different strategies
while taking into account various auction design parameters.
4.4.2 Outcome Analysis
Previous research in B2C context has shown that different bidding strategies might result in
differences of winning likelihood and payoff (Bapna et al., 2004). In our case, given that all the
observed bids are winning bids, it is not possible to compare the winning likelihood of different
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Table 4.7: Summary of hypothesis test.
H1a: bidders with a high budget constraint are more likely to choose
evaluator strategies over opportunistic strategies.
H1b: bidders with a high budget constraint are more likely to choose
forward-looking, evaluator strategies than conservative, evaluator
strategies.
H1a is supported.
H1b is not supported.
H2a: bidders are more likely to choose opportunistic strategies over
evaluator strategies when they have a large demand.
H2b: bidders more likely to choose participator strategies over the eval-
uator strategies when they have a large demand.
H2a is supported.
H2b is supported.
H3a: bidders in the online channel are more likely to choose the oppor-
tunistic strategies over evaluator strategies.
H3b: bidders in the online channel are more likely to choose
forward-looking, opportunistic strategies over conservative, oppor-
tunistic strategies.
H3a is supported.
H3b is supported.
strategies. As the result, we focus on the impact of bidders’ strategic choices on their surplus.
Since bidders’ valuations of flowers are unknown, we measure their surplus extraction using
loss-of-surplus which is defined as the difference between bidders’ winning prices in an auction
and the lowest winning price within the same auction.
Compared with single-unit auctions, bidders in sequential auctions have the opportunity to
learn the market trend and opponents’ information (e.g., demand, willingness-to-pay) from the
previous rounds. Since opportunists tend to wait longer in an auction and place a bid later
than the evaluators and participants (see Table 4.3), they are likely to acquire more market
information and thus have a competitive advantage. Further, we expect that such competitive
advantage is more prominent in auctions of larger lot size. Formally, we hypothesize that
H4a: Opportunistic strategies perform better than the other strategies in minimizing bidders’
loss-of-surplus.
H4b: Opportunistic strategies perform better than the other strategies in minimizing bidders’
loss-of-surplus in auctions with big lot size.
We use a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test the above hypotheses. HLM was first
proposed by education researchers (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) and it has become popular
in many other research domains. The main advantage of HLM is that it allows for random
variations in both the intercepts and slopes and thus it helps to control for the clustering of
observations.
In order to control for the unobservable confounding effects which varies from day to day,
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we normalize the winning prices on each day with respect to the minimum and maximum prices
on that day, i.e., if the winning price in transaction j is Pj and the minimum and maximum prices
on that day is Pmin and Pmax respectively, the normalized price is given by (Pj−Pmin)/(Pmax−
Pmin). Thus the normalized price can be used directly as the measure of a bidder’s loss-of-
surplus in a given transaction. Further, since there is more than one supplier for the specific
type of flower under consideration, we also include supplier dummies in the model to control
for the potential reputation effects (Koppius et al., 2004) . The full model specification is shown
in Equation 4.2a-4.2d. In Equation 4.2a, the dependent variable Pˆjk is the normalized winning
price paid by bidder k in transaction j. LotSize refers to the total available units of the lot
where transaction j belongs. MinPQ is the minimum purchase quantity in transaction j and
Supplier is a set of dummy variables which are used to capture the potential reputation effects
associated with the identities of suppliers. In Equation 4.2b-4.2d, EE −C, O−C, P −C and
EE − F are dummy variables which correspond to the bidding strategies defined in Table 4.3.
The baseline strategy is the forward-looking, opportunistic (O − F ) strategy.
Pˆjk = β0k + β1kLotSizejk + β2kMinPQjk + γSupplierj + jk (4.2a)
β0k = r00 + r01EE − Ck + r02O − Ck + r03P − Ck + r04EE − Fk + u0k (4.2b)
β1k = r10 + r11EE − Ck + r12O − Ck + r13P − Ck + r14EE − Fk (4.2c)
β2k = r20 + r21EE − Ck + r22O − Ck + r23P − Ck + r24EE − Fk (4.2d)
As the benchmark, we consider a simple linear model which does not account for clustering of
observations, i.e.,
Pˆjk = β0 + β1LotSizejk + β2MinPQjk + γSupplierj + . (4.3)
We applied Maximum-Likelihood (ML) method to estimate the coefficients in the above mod-
els. The results are summarized in Table 4.8 and 4.9.
The first thing to note from Table 4.8 is that the opportunistic strategies yield significantly
lower winning prices8 than both participator strategies and evaluator strategies, which supports
our hypothesis H4a. Also, we can see that both LotSize and MinPQ have a negative effect on
price, although the magnitude of such effect is rather small.
8Since the dependent variables in Equation 4.2a and 4.3 are normalized with respect to the daily maximum
and minimum of winning prices, the coefficients in Table 4.8 and 4.9 cannot be interpreted as marginal changes of
winning prices with respect to the specific independent variable. To see the marginal effects of these variables, the
coefficients need to be multiplied by the corresponding price gap (Pmax − Pmin) on a given day, e.g., if the price
gap is 30 cent, the conservative, early evaluators would, on average, pay 2 cent more than the forward-looking
opportunists.
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Table 4.8: Estimation results of the HLM model.
Variable Coefficient Std. error Sig.
Intercept 0.3968 0.0125 0.0000***
EE-C 0.0743 0.0181 0.0000***
O-C -0.0417 0.0186 0.0248*
P-C 0.0586 0.0159 0.0002***
EE-F 0.1038 0.0186 0.0000***
LotSize -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000***
MinPQ -0.0059 0.0031 0.0536 ·
S5547 0.3788 0.0056 0.0000***
S79520 -0.4431 0.0066 0.0000***
S80547 0.4037 0.0078 0.0000***
S562450 -0.1791 0.0065 0.0000***
EE-C : LotSize 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000***
O-C : LotSize 0.0003 0.0001 0.0187*
P-C : LotSize 0.0001 0.0001 0.2774
EE-F : LotSize 0.0000 0.0001 0.9998
EE-C : MinPQ -0.0155 0.0055 0.0051**
O-C : MinPQ 0.0115 0.0048 0.0161*
P-C : MinPQ -0.0088 0.0041 0.0330*
EE-F : MinPQ -0.0216 0.0060 0.0003***
Table 4.9: Estimation results of the simple linear model.
Variable Coefficient Std. error Sig.
Intercept 0.4507 0.0061 0.0000***
LotSize -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000***
MinPQ -0.0160 0.0014 0.0000***
S5547 0.3770 0.0057 0.0000***
S79520 -0.4417 0.0068 0.0000***
S80547 0.4068 0.0080 0.0000***
S562450 -0.1843 0.0066 0.0000***
Further, we find significant interaction effects between bidding strategies and the two auc-
tion design parameters. Specifically, the results suggest that the prices paid by forward-looking
opportunists (O − F , the baseline used in the HLM model) decrease at a faster rate than con-
servative bidders (EE − C, O − C) when LotSize increases. Thus H4b is supported. On the
other hand, the evaluators and participators are more sensitive to the increase in MinPQ – the
prices paid by these bidders decrease faster than opportunists when MinPQ increases.
Finally, both Table 4.8 and 4.9 suggest there are significant reputation effects, for example,
the normalized prices of products from Supplier 5547 and Supplier 80547 are higher than prod-
ucts from others. At the first sight, the existence of such reputation effects might raise concerns
about the cluster analysis, because if bidders do have preferences over the suppliers, this might
influence their entering decisions in an auction. However, since the order of lots from different
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suppliers is determined by a random draw every day, it is highly unlikely that some suppliers’
products would always be auctioned earlier than others.
We also compared the performance of the two models. The AIC and BIC values for the
hierarchical model are smaller (-5745, -5604) than the simple linear model (-5476, -5420),
indicating that the incorporation of the clustering results significantly improves the model fit.
4.5 Discussion
We developed a robust taxonomy of bidding strategies in a multi-channel B2B market. Although
there are similarities in the empirical characterization of bidding strategies across the B2B and
B2C contexts, some of the regularities observed in the B2C context do not carry to the B2B
context. For example, we do not observe any sip-and-dippers (Bapna et al., 2004). This to some
extent could be attributed to the differences in the auction mechanism - in the English auction,
we can observe all the placed bids (both winning and losing bids) whereas in the Dutch auction,
only winning bids get revealed. However, given the sequential nature of these auctions, it is still
surprising that bidders did not exhibit modified demand reduction (Goes et al., 2010) at auction
level, i.e., purchasing a small amount in early rounds and a large amount in later round. Further,
we did not identify any recurrent or intermittent strategies as described by Goes et al. (2012)
in their study of sequential B2C markets. In fact, the majority of the bidders, except for the
participators, seem to be actively bidding only for a short time (either early or late) on a given
day (see Table 4.3 for the time of entry and exit on a day).
We examine the antecedents of the observed heterogeneity in bidding strategies. Our find-
ings show that bidders’ strategic choices can be explained by their budget constraint, demand
as well as their channel affiliation. Overall, bidders with a high budget and a large demand are
likely to choose participator or opportunistic strategies rather than evaluator strategies, and bid-
ders who use the online bidding channel are more likely to adopt the opportunistic strategies. At
the outset, these results are consistent with the previous empirical auction literature. However,
the findings from our analysis offer a higher level of granularity. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first empirical study that examines bidders’ strategic behavior in multi-channel B2B
auctions.
Further, we analyzed the economic impact of different strategies. Our results suggest that
opportunists outperform both participators and evaluators in maximizing their surplus. This
differs from the previous study by Bapna et al. (2004) where the authors show the participators
perform best among non-agent bidders in terms of surplus extraction. Such difference can
be attributed to the nature of auctions and bidders’ business constraint. Specifically, Bapna
et al. (2004) examine the Yankee auctions where the market clears only once at the end of a
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pre-specified time period. Therefore, the participators can always revise their bids by closely
monitoring the market dynamics during an auction. In the case of the DFA, bidders do not know
when the market clears at auction level. Also, we have seen that participators are likely to have
a large demand than the other types of bidders and in many cases, fulfilling the orders from their
customers per se is more important than getting the products at the lowest possible price.
We also find a significant main effect of lot size, which is consistent with Mithas and Jones
(2007) but different from earlier work in B2C auctions by Bapna et al. (2001). In particular,
we have seen that lot size has a negative overall effect on the winning price of a given product,
although such overall effect is moderated by bidding strategies.
4.5.1 Implications
The findings and results from the current study have important implications for theory and
practice. From the theoretical perspective, the identification of the five distinctive strategic
types in the DFA challenges the conventional notion that bidders’ strategies converge as they
gather more and more experience by participating in the competition repeatedly and calls for a
dynamic instead of static view in studying bidding behavior in complex environment. Addition-
ally, previous research by Goes et al. (2012) show that in B2C sequential auctions bidders are
more likely to choose intermittent strategies as they gain experience by participating in many
auctions, however, in our case, we did not find any bidder following these strategies despite
that they are all experienced in these auctions. Such discrepancy between the strategies pursued
in B2C and B2B context underscores the necessity to understand the differences in bidders’
incentive structures in the two types of bidding environments. In this sense, our explanatory
model which maps bidders’ choices of strategies to their business constraints and requirements
provide a useful starting point.
Further, our findings shed new light on the declining price anomaly of sequential auctions9.
Currently, the explanations to declining price in sequential rounds can be cast into two broad
categories. The first category consists of studies that examine bidder heterogeneity in terms
of risk profiles (McAfee and Vincent, 1993)) or product heterogeneity (Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
1994) whereas the second category focuses on the informational effect in the sequential auc-
tions (Jeitschko, 1998). Our analysis of the antecedents and consequences of bidding strategies
9Within the symmetric independent private value paradigm, Weber (1983) has shown that in sequential auctions
where bidders have single-unit demand, the equilibrium price path under the standard auction formats and pricing
rules follows a martingale – the expected winning price in the future round and the current round are the same.
However, such neat theoretical results are not supported by empirical findings. For example, McAfee and Vincent
(1993) have found price declines in sequential wine auctions. Similar declining price phenomena are also observed
in art auctions (Beggs and Graddy, 1997) and flower auctions (Van den Berg et al., 2001). The contradiction
between theory and empirical findings has been coined as declining price anomaly.
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suggest that both bidder heterogeneity and the informational effect play a role in determining
the price path in sequential auctions. More specifically, the early evaluators are likely to be
more risk averse and they would rather pay a risk premium at the beginning of an auction to
ensure the fulfillment of orders. On the contrary, the opportunists exhibit a certain degree of
gambling behavior: in order to acquire the products at the best price, they are willing to trade
the opportunity to purchase in earlier rounds for more information about the market conditions.
From the managerial perspective, our results provide useful insights to auctioneers in their
complex decision-making in the DFA. The auctioneers in the DFA represent the growers. As
such, their main objective is to realize high prices. Besides, it is also important that they achieve
a quick turnaround since flowers are perishable goods. By controlling key auction parameters
such as starting prices, minimum purchase quantities and reserve prices, the auctioneers can
influence the dynamics of the auction. The taxonomy can be viewed as a micro-segmentation
of the market and thus is useful in optimizing the auction process. For example, currently,
the lot sizes are determined by the suppliers who have little information about the strategic
characteristics of the buyers. Auctioneers on the other hand can observe the bidders’ behavior
in real time. Given the significant interaction effect between lot size and bidders’ strategies,
auctioneers should tailor the decisions on lot sizes to the composition of bidder population. In
addition, we have found that evaluators and participators are more sensitive than opportunists
to the change of minimum purchase quantity. Therefore, auctioneers might need to think of
alternative strategies other than increasing the minimum purchase quantity in order to speed
up the market process. In light of the declining price trend and the competitive advantage of
opportunists, auctioneers should also develop better information transparency strategies across
different market channels. Finally, the separation of conservative strategies and forward-looking
strategies along the day-level entering time, i.e., TOE-D suggests that there is great potential to
customize the auction schedules and further improve the total revenue.
4.5.2 Limitations and Future Work
Our paper bears several limitations that, nevertheless, open up avenues for future research.
For example, we do not take into account for the potential screening effects when performing
the cluster analysis. According to the results from the outcome analysis, if bidders’ entering
decisions are conditional on their preferences over the suppliers, we might need to adapt the
current explanatory model for bidders’ strategic choices accordingly and the implications might
be different. Further, we chose to analyze bidders’ strategies at day-level instead of auction-level
because it helps us to better capture the B2B features of these auctions. However, this makes it
difficult to analyze bidders’ strategic changes across different auctions over a day. Nevertheless,
given the nature of these auctions, i.e., high variation of auction length and only winning bids
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are visible, we think that the results from sequence analysis of winning bids across different
auctions might be less useful then in the English type of online auctions.
Another potential weakness with the current study is that we have focused on the auctions
of a specific type of product when examining bidders’ behavior. In reality, bidders might have
to deal with constraints of product complementarity in their bidding decisions. However, we do
not have access to any data set that consists of transactions across different product groups. We
plan to investigate these issues by computational simulations.
Currently, we are building a rich simulation platform, taking into account the strategic pat-
terns of the bidder population. Such platform allows us to experiment with alternative auction
designs and different information revelation policies. The results from these experiments will
provide useful implications to practitioners in B2B markets.
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Chapter 5
Information Transparency in Sequential
B2B Auctions
5.1 Introduction
The proliferation of electronic marketplaces has brought tremendous changes to the business
world. Compared with the traditional brick-and-mortar markets, these Internet-enabled mar-
ketplaces substantially reduce consumer’ search costs (Bakos, 1997) and thus enable them to
better discern products that best fit their needs. Firms, however, are forced to deal with the
paradox of the benefits brought by the electronic marketplaces (Granados et al., 2010). On one
hand, the increased availability of information allows them to strategically target consumers
in various markets. On the other hand, the increased transparency of markets makes it more
difficult to capture profits because their competitors and consumers are better informed (Porter,
2001). The two sides of the coin of information transparency for firms motivate us to study the
strategic revelation of information in Business-to-Business (B2B) environment.
Information transparency, which is defined as the level of availability and accessibility of
market information to its participants (Zhu, 2004), is deemed to be good to the whole supply
chain because it helps improve the allocative efficiency (Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Lee et al.,
2000; Patnayakuni et al., 2006). Yet it affects the two sides of the market, i.e., buyers and sellers,
very differently. For example, using a comprehensive analytical model, Zhou and Zhu (2010)
show that depending on the competition mode of the downstream industry, one side will always
be worse off under the increased transparency enabled by the electronic B2B markets, although
the total welfare of market participants are increased regardless of the competition mode.
Given the conflict of interest in the market, a natural question for the B2B market-maker is
how to design and implement the information revelation policies for its own benefits1. What
1According to Yoo et al. (2007), B2B markets can be classified into three types based on their ownership
structure: buyer-owned marketplaces, seller-owned marketplaces, and neutral marketplaces that are owned by in-
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information should be disclosed? Under what conditions? The answers to these questions
depend largely on the real-world context.
In this paper, we focus on information transparency in a complex B2B setting, the Dutch
Flower Auctions. The Dutch Flower Auctions are multi-unit, sequential, Dutch auctions. They
account for more than 60% of the global flower trade and generate over 4 billion euros annually.
The sheer magnitude of transactions in this market makes it important to carefully weigh the
trade-offs of different transparency strategies. Using a field experiment, we seek to understand
how the disclosure of winners’ identities influence the behavior of market participants and the
final outcome in these auctions.
Drawing upon the linkage principle (Milgrom and Weber, 1982b), which basically states
that a seller can expect to increase revenues by providing more information to bidders, both
before and during the auction2, we expect that disclosing winners’ identities would yield higher
revenue for the sellers in these auctions. Surprisingly, however, our analysis of the experimental
data shows that bidders, on average, pay significantly lower (4.5%) prices when auctioneers
disclose the winners’ identities rather than withholding such information. Further, in light of
the literature on declining price anomaly (Van den Berg et al., 2001), we also look into the
informational effects of winners’ identities on price dynamics at auction-level, and find that
withholding winners’ identities tends to mitigate the declining trend in a sequential auction
Since bidders in these auctions participate in the bidding activities repeatedly over a long
period3, it is likely that the failure of the linkage principle is due to bidders’ tacit collusion (Ba-
jari and Yeo, 2009; Sherstyuk and Dulatre, 2008). In general, collusion is easier to sustain
in environments that are more transparent. Therefore, we examine the relationship between
bidders’ participatory patterns and revelation policies (i.e., whether winners’ identities are dis-
closed or not). Our analysis shows that bidders who restrict their purchases to a few number
of sellers (thus more likely to collude), on average, pay lower (9.8%, statistically significant)
prices when winner’s identities are disclosed. However, when such information is not available,
such price-related advantage is mitigated substantially.
Our paper makes several contributions to the growing body of information systems (IS)
literature on the design of transparency strategies in B2B markets. First of all, we present em-
dependent third parties. The ownership structure has a direct impact on the market-maker’s choice of transparency
strategies.
2The linkage principle was derived under symmetric affiliation (Milgrom and Weber, 1982b). In our case, while
bidders in the flower auctions typically serve distinct market segments and there are certainly individual-specific,
private-value components in their purchases, common-value components surely exist, too. For example, Koppius
et al. (2004) have shown that sellers’ reputation plays a critical role in determining the final transaction prices,
suggesting that there is some unknown quality that matters to all potential buyers.
3According to the auctioneers, most of the bidders have been participating in the bidding for five or sometimes
ten years.
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pirical evidence that linkage principle might not hold for B2B sequential Dutch auctions. In
other words, sellers might be worse off by revealing more information to bidders. Compared
with previous studies, for example, Arora et al. (2007); Greenwald et al. (2010); Zhu (2004)),
we study information revelation policies in a complex real-world environment. Additionally,
most of the existing studies focus on the revelation of bids in English auctions, we on the other
hand examines the revelation of winners’ identities in Dutch auctions where only winning bids
are revealed and thereby, less transparent by their nature. To the best of our knowledge, no
prior work has compared different revelation policies in Dutch auctions using field data. Sec-
ondly, our results provide additional insights of the declining price anomaly (Ashenfelter, 1989;
McAfee and Vincent, 1993; Van den Berg et al., 2001). From the managerial perspective, our
findings offer a cheap yet effective way to mitigate the declining trend of prices by concealing
winners’ identities in the multi-unit, sequential Dutch auctions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related
literature. Section 3 introduces the empirical setting. In Section 4, we first present the econo-
metric model and the empirical results, and continue with a discussion of robustness checks and
additional analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the findings and discusses the implications .
5.2 Related Literature
In this section, we discuss two streams of literature on sequential auctions that are closely
related to the current study.
5.2.1 Information Revelation in Auctions
The popularity of online auction platforms has drawn an increasing research interest in the de-
sign of information-revelation policies (Arora et al., 2007; Greenwald et al., 2010). While Mil-
grom and Weber (1982a)’s linkage principle suggests that sellers typically benefit by providing
more information to bidders4, in many real-world applications, the information-revelation prob-
lem is more subtle, for example, sellers might not be able to directly release the information,
or they might not have full control of bidders’ perceived content of the information (Abraham
et al., 2013).
When it comes to multi-unit (sequential) auctions, the analysis of different information-
revelation policies becomes more difficult and the findings concerning the linkage principle are
mixed. Perry and Reny (1999) provide a counter-example where the linkage principle breaks
4One can imagine numerous circumstances where the disclosure of information can have negative impact on
the auction outcome (for example, if the seller revealed information about the defects of the item under auction),
however, the remarkable implication from the linkage principle is that, ex ante,, releasing more information can
help increase the seller’s expected revenue.
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down in multi-unit auctions. On the contrary, Arora et al. (2007) and Greenwald et al. (2010)
show that complete information policy (which minimizes the uncertainty on market structure
and opponents’ cost structure, respectively) generates higher buyer surplus in sequential pro-
curement auctions, suggesting that linkage principle holds for these auctions.
So far, most of the existing research on information-revelation policies in auctions is purely
analytical, i.e. the results are derived from equilibrium analysis of different auction models
where bidders are assumed to be strictly rational. The few papers that empirically tests the link-
age principle using controlled lab experiments (Kagel and Levin, 1986; Levin and Smith, 1996),
the results are again inconclusive. Specifically, researchers find that in experiments involving
inexperienced bidders, the winner’s curse5 due to overbidding is more prevalent in sealed-bid
auctions (less transparent) than English auctions. This leads to higher revenues in sealed-bid
auctions than English ones, contrary to the prediction of linkage principle. However, in exper-
iments involving experienced bidders, the winner’s curse is alleviated and sellers’ revenues are
higher in English auctions, which is consistent with the linkage principle.
In the current study, we examine the impact of information revelation policy on seller rev-
enue using a large field experiment. Compared with previous work, our empirical setting fea-
tures a complex, dynamic market where bidders are highly experienced.
5.2.2 Declining Price Anomaly
Within the symmetric independent private value paradigm (IPVP), Weber (1983) shows that in
sequential auctions where bidders have single-unit demand, the equilibrium price path under the
standard auction formats and pricing rules follows a martingale6 – the expected winning price
in the future round and the current round are the same. When bidders have multi-unit demand,
Donald et al. (2006) demonstrate that the equilibrium price path follows a super-martingale,
i.e., the equilibrium price rises as a sequential auction proceeds. However, such neat theoretical
results are not supported by empirical findings. Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee and Vincent
(1993) have found price declines in sequential wine auctions. Similar declining price phenom-
ena are also observed in art auctions (Beggs and Graddy, 1997) and flower auctions (Van den
Berg et al., 2001).
The contradiction between theory and empirical findings, which has been coined as declin-
ing price anomaly, has attracted a significant amount of research which attempts to offer plau-
sible explanations. These explanations can be cast into two broad categories. The first category
consists of studies that examine bidder heterogeneity (McAfee and Vincent, 1993) or product
5For more details about winner’s curse, see P. 84 in (Krishna, 2002).
6In probability theory, a martingale is a model of a fair game where knowledge of past events never helps
predict the mean of the future winnings (Williams, 1991).
81
65
heterogeneity (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994). The second category focuses on the informational
effect in the sequential auctions. For example, Jeitschko (1998) associates the declining price
anomaly with two unique learning effects in sequential auctions–a direct effect where informa-
tion from the previous rounds is used to form the current bids and an anticipation effect where
bidders try to account for the effect of their earlier bids on their opponents’ bids.
In this study, we do not attempt to probe into the causal relationships between various en-
dogenous or exogenous factors and the price decline. Instead, we are interested in whether
information revelation policy affects the declining trend in fast-paced sequential auctions.
5.3 Empirical Setting
In this section, we provide details of the experiment design and the data collected from the field
experiment.
5.3.1 Experimental Design
We conduct a quasi-natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) to investigate how the
disclosure of winners’ information affect the bidding dynamics and outcomes in the complex
environment of the Dutch Flower Auctions. The experiment ran from November 19 to De-
cember 7, 2012 on a clock which auctioned chrysanthemums7 at a major site. Aside from the
transaction data from the treatment site during the experimental period, we also collected data
from the same site before the experimental period (from October 29 to November 16), and data
from a control site8 before and during the experimental period.
The experimental treatment was implemented as follows. After the first bidder stopped the
clock and made a purchase, all the bidders could see the winning price (indicated by a marker on
the clock) and the remaining unit(s), just as in the regular setting of the Dutch Flower Auctions.
However, the winner’s identity was removed from the clock screen. In other words, none of the
bidders, except the winner herself, knew who was the winner in the current round9.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the experimental design. Basically, bidders could always
observe winners’ identities at both the treatment site and control site prior to the experiment
7Chrysanthemum has the second largest transaction amount among all the auctioned products. In 2012, more
than 1.1 million units of chrysanthemums were traded.
8Technically speaking, with the introduction of online channel, bidders can choose to purchase from any one of
the six auction sites within the country. However, bidders usually choose the one closest to their distribution center
in order to minimize the logistic cost. This is particular the case for large buyers (e.g., wholesalers). However,
other than the operational and logistic cost, there is no a priori structural differences in terms of product, auction
mechanism and policy between different auction sites.
9As the researcher, we always have access to the winners’ identities since they were registered in the auctioning
system during each transaction.
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period, whereas during the experiment period only bidders at the control site had access to
such information. To make sure that bidders were well informed about the change during the
experiment period, at the end of October 2012, the auction department of the company held a
Webinar where auctioneers and bidders could exchange their thoughts. As a follow-up survey,
we also held interview sessions with several buyers who had participated in the bidding during
the experimental period.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the experimental design.
As opposed to those controlled lab experiments examining information revelation policies
(for example, Cason et al. (2011)), the main advantage of our field experiment is that it re-
tains the rich interaction (both explicit and implicit) and dynamics from the real-world B2B
auctions and thus allows us to better investigate the nuances of professional bidders’ behavior
that naturally occurs under different revelation policies.
5.3.2 Data and Preliminary Analysis
In order to control for the product heterogeneity, we selected the transactions of Chrysanthemum
spray white/yellow GP. The total number of transactions at the treatment site during period I
(pre-experiment) is 11,613 (from 1,798 auctions) where 10,427 transactions were made via
the online channel (See Section 2.2.1), and the total number of transactions during period II
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(experiment) is 11,899 (from 1,855 auctions) where 10,833 transactions were through the online
channel.
Table 5.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics. We can see that while buyers’ bidding be-
havior 10 does not vary much from period I to period II, the average winning price increases
considerably (14.6%). In addition, we split the transactions into two sub-samples: transactions
made via the online channel and those via the traditional offline channel (onsite bidding), and
calculated the average winning prices during the two periods. Figure 5.2 shows that the average
winning prices are higher during the experiment period for both channels (14.8% for the online
channel and 15.4% for offline channel).
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the dataset.
Statistics Lot Size
# of bidders
per auction
Bid frequency
(auction)
Bid frequency
(day) Price (cent)
Purchase
amount
I II I II I II I II I II I II
Mean 68.0 64.2 6.3 6.2 1.0 1.0 4.3 4.5 26.7 30.6 10.5 9.9
Median 57.0 52.0 6.0 6.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 25.0 30.0 5.0 5.0
Std. 59.9 53.3 4.1 4.0 0.2 0.2 4.3 4.6 9.6 7.3 16.8 14.9
Skewness 2.4 2.3 1.1 1.0 6.2 6.3 2.1 2.2 0.4 0.1 6.1 5.6
Minimum 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 1
Maximum 580 450 32 32 3 4 29 34 62 66 347 264
In light of the literature on declining price trend in sequential auctions, we also examined the
evolution of transaction prices at auction-level during the pre-experiment and experiment peri-
ods, respectively. Given the potential unobserved heterogeneity across lots, we normalized the
transaction prices in subsequent rounds with the first round in an given auction. The comparison
is depicted in Figure 5.3, where we have two observations. First, the price exhibits an overall
declining trend in both the pre-experiment and experiment periods. Second, the declining trend
seems to be alleviated during the experiment period. More specifically, the mean values of
normalized prices in the subsequent rounds during the experiment period are higher than those
observed during the pre-experiment period, and the variances of the normalized prices also
shrink considerably during the experiment period.
These aggregate-level results seem to suggest that withholding winners’ identities has a
positive impact on the transaction prices. However, the main concern about such model-free
evidence is that it does not control for any potential systematic changes in market conditions.
For example, it is likely that there was a higher demand during the experiment period, or bidders
10We use number of rounds a bidder participated in an auction, i.e., Bid frequency (auction) and the number of
auction a bidder participated on a given day, i.e., Bid frequency (day) to characterize bidders’ bidding behavior in
the two periods.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of average winning prices in pre-experiment and experiment period.
Figure 5.3: Comparison of price dynamics at auction-level during pre-experiment and experi-
ment periods.The rank number denotes the rank of the current transaction, i.e., if a transaction
was made in the 2nd round, the rank number is 2. The vertical bars denote one standard devia-
tions of the normalized prices in each round.
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who participated in the auctions during the experiment period are not the same ones participat-
ing in the pre-experiment period.
5.4 Econometric Model
In order to identify the causal impact of the policy change regarding information transparency on
transaction prices of sequential auctions, we use the so-called difference-in-differences (DID)
technique by taking the matched sample from the control site.
DID is a quasi-experiment technique that models the treatment effect by estimating the
difference between outcome measures at two time periods for both the treated subjects and
the controls and then comparing the difference between the treated and control groups (Meyer,
1995).
If we use t = 0 to denote the pre-experiment period and t = 1 to denote the experiment
period, logPi,t to denote the log-transformed price for transaction i in period t, the underlying
model for DID can be written as follows:
logPi,t = β0 + β1Tt + β2Gi + β3Gi ∗ Tt + γXi,t + i,t, (5.1)
where Gi and Tt are both dummy variables, Gi taking the value 1 if transaction i is from the
treatment site and 0 if it is from the control site, and Tt = 1 if t = 1 and 0 otherwise. Xi,t
is the control variable for the observed covariates such as product characteristics (e.g., stem
length, blooming stage) and auction design parameters (e.g., minimum purchase quantity). The
DID estimator is just the OLS estimate of β3, i.e., the coefficient of the interaction term. Note
that β1 summarizes the way that both the treatment and control groups are influenced by time.
Additionally, all the time-invariant differences between the two groups are captured by β2.
Therefore, the model specified in Equation 5.1 ensures that any variables that remain constant
over time (which may not be observed) that are correlated with the outcome variable will not
bias the estimated effect.
5.5 Results
In this section, we first presents the main results and then continue with the discussion of ro-
bustness check and additional analyses.
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5.5.1 Main Results
We applied the DID model to the pooled panel data, i.e., the transactions from the treatment site
and control site during the pre-experiment and experiment period11. In total, we have 54592
transactions. Table 5.2 shows the result of the regression. For the demonstration purpose, we
only included the coefficients related to the treatment.
Table 5.2: Estimation results of the DID model (entire sample).
Coefficient Estimate Std. error P-value
Treatment period (β1) 0.127 0.003 0.000 ***
Treatment site (β2) -0.005 0.012 0.674
Treatment period ∗ Treatment site (β3) 0.045 0.005 0.000 ***
Adjusted R2: 0.187
We can see that the winning price increased by 4.5% at the treatment site during the experi-
ment period. In other words, withholding winners’ identities led to significantly higher revenue.
Given that the sheer magnitude of these auctions, the impact of the change in information reve-
lation policy can be remarkable.
Given that most bidders participated in these auctions via the online channel (see data de-
scription in Section 5.3.2), we would like to know whether the effect of policy change holds for
both online and offline bidders. In order to assess how the withholding of winners’ identities
influence bidders in different channels, we re-estimated Equation 5.1 for transactions made via
the online and offline channel, respectively. Table 5.3 and 5.4 show that both online and offline
bidders paid more under the treatment condition: on average, online bidders paid 4.1% higher
and offline bidders paid 6.5% higher when winners’ identities were concealed. This suggests
that the loss of the winners’ information could not be compensated by the other market state
information (Koppius, 2002) communicated in the auction room.
Further, since the preliminary analysis suggests that concealing winners’ identities has some
mitigation effect on price declining trend, we also examined the impact of the policy change on
price dynamics at lot-level, using a hierarchical linear model (HLM). HLM was first proposed
by education researchers (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) and it has become popular in many
other research domains. The main advantage of HLM is that it allows for random variations in
both the intercepts and slopes and thus it helps to control for the clustering of observations. The
11Before fitting the field data to the DID model, we also checked bidders’ potential switching behavior, i.e.,
bidders who participated in the auctions at the treatment site during the pre-experiment period did not switch to
auctions at the control site during the experiment period, or the other way around. After going through all the
transaction details of the specific flowers during the 6 weeks, we did not find evidence of switching.
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Table 5.3: Estimation results of the DID model on the sub-sample of online transactions.
Online transactions
Coefficient Estimate Std. error P-value
Treatment period (β1) 0.128 0.004 0.000 ***
Treatment site (β2) 0.005 0.014 0.677
Treatment period ∗ Treatment site (β3) 0.041 0.006 0.000 ***
Adjusted R2: 0.185
Table 5.4: Estimation results of the DID model on the sub-sample of offline transactions.
Offline transactions
Coefficient Estimate Std. error P-value
Treatment period (β1) 0.125 0.007 0.000 ***
Treatment site (β2) -0.133 0.035 0.000 ***
Treatment period ∗ Treatment site (β3) 0.065 0.015 0.000 ***
Adjusted R2: 0.204
full model is specified as follows:
Level 1 : log
Pt,k,l
Pt,k−1,l
= γ0,t + γ1,t(k − 2) + γ2,t(Available− 2) + k,l, (5.2a)
k > 1, Avaialble > 1,
Level 2 :γ0,t = w00 + w01Tt + u0,t, (5.2b)
γ1,t = w10 + w11Tt, (5.2c)
γ2,t = w20 + w21Tt, , (5.2d)
where l refers to the lot index, k is the rank number of the transaction, and Available stands
for the available units in the current round. Since we are comparing the transaction prices in
consecutive rounds within an auction, we only need transaction data from the treatment site to
estimate the model in Equation 5.5.1- 5.2d. This is different from previous analyses. Further, in
Equation , instead of a simple linear regression on the rank number of the transaction, we follow
the practice proposed in Van den Berg et al. (2001) where the difference of the logarithmic prices
in consecutive rounds is used as the dependent variable. The benefits of such practice are two-
fold: (i) it controls for potential confounding factors that influence the length (the maximum of
the rank number) of an auction and the transaction prices simultaneously, (ii) it addresses the
potential correlation of prices within a sequential auction, which may result in biased estimation.
It follows from Table 5.5 that concealing winners’ identities has significant mitigation effect
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on the price declining trend, however, the magnitude of such effect is negligible when compared
to the average price decline.
Table 5.5: Impact of policy change on lot-level declining price trend.
Coefficient Estimate Std. error P-value
Intercept (w00) -0.0215 0.0012 0.000 ***
Treatment period (w01) 0.0028 0.0016 0.0894 ·
Rank number (w10) 0.0015 0.0002 0.000 ***
Available units (w20) - 0.00005 0.00001 0.000 ***
Treatment period ∗ Rank number (w11) -0.0002 0.0002 0.2815
Treatment period ∗ Available units (w21) 0.00005 0.00002 0.003 **
5.5.2 Robustness Check
Because bidders were informed about the policy change prior to the experiment period, it is
likely that the observed differences in transaction prices were due to the novelty effect or
Hawthorne effect, which is defined as the problem in field experiments that subjects’ knowledge
that they are in an experiment modifies their behavior from what it would have been without
that knowledge (Adair, 1984). Therefore, we conducted robustness check to further confirm the
findings about the effect of policy change.
Given that the experiment lasted for three weeks, we created three new sub-samples by
pooling each of the three weeks’ transaction data with the data from pre-experiment period. If
the observed treatment effect from Table 5.2 as well as Table 5.3 and 5.4 is due to Hawthorne
effect, we would expect the price increase diminish over time (Clark and Sugrue, 1988). Thus
we re-estimated the model in Equation 5.1 on the three sub-samples. Table 5.6 summarizes the
estimation results. Overall, we can see that the treatment effect remains positive and significant
over the three weeks: in Week 1, the average price increased by 1.9 % under the treatment
condition whereas in Week 2 and 3, price increased by 5.1%, thus providing further assurance
that our main results in Table 5.2 are robust.
Table 5.6: Results of robustness check on the sub-samples.
Week 1 (Nov.19-23) Week 2 (Nov. 26-30) Week 3 (Dec. 3-7)
Coefficient Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Treatment period (β1) 0.210 0.000 *** 0.200 0.000 *** -0.026 0.000 ***
Treatment (β2) -0.044 0.011 * -0.010 0.561 0.042 0.020 *
Treatment period ∗ Treatment site (β3) 0.019 0.015 * 0.051 0.000 *** 0.051 0.000 ***
Adjusted R2: 0.202 Adjusted R2: 0.210 Adjusted R2: 0.127
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5.5.3 Additional Analysis
So far, our analysis shows that bidders paid significantly higher prices under the treatment
condition, regardless of the market channels they chose. A natural question is why bidders paid
more when the winners’ identities were concealed.
Given that bidders in this market have been competing in these auctions repeatedly for a long
period of time and many of them know each other very well, it is possible that some bidders
might engage in tacit collusion, i.e., coordination between several competing players (typically
large ones) without overt communication or agreement (Bajari and Yeo, 2009; Sherstyuk and
Dulatre, 2008). There are two essential elements for tacit collusion: 1) a transparent mechanism
for coordinating on a collusive outcome; and 2) a plausible amount of mutual understanding
among firms (Harrington, 2012). For example, if two large bidders always end up in competing
for products from the same supplier, they might be have the incentive to implicitly coordinate
their bids.. For example, if two large bidders always end up in competing for products from the
same supplier, they might be better off by coordinating their bidding behavior. If this is the case,
the public signal of winners’ identities would be indispensable to the stability of the cartels – the
defect member (bidders who did not follow the collusive strategy) could easily be identified and
punished by other members within the cartel. This rationale leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Bidders with a higher tendency to engage in tacit collusion pay lower prices when winners’
identities are disclosed.
In order to test this hypothesis, we first need to quantify bidders’ tendency of collusion. We
define a bidder’s collusion index as the inverse of the total number of suppliers from whom he
made purchases. The larger a bidder’s collusion index is, the higher his tendency of collusion12.
We then classify bidders into two types – the ones with high tendency to collusion and those
with low tendency to collusion – using the median of the collusion index for all bidders during
the pre-experiment period.
We use the following hierarchical model to test the above hypothesis:
Level 1 : logPi,j,t = β0,j + β1Tt + β2Gi + β3,jGi ∗ Tt + γXi,t + i,j,t, (5.3a)
Level 2 : β0,j = α00 + α01Hj + u0,j, (5.3b)
β3,j = α30 + +α31Hj, (5.3c)
where Hj is a dummy variable, Hj = 1 if bidder j is classified as having high tendency of
collusion. The estimation results are shown in Table 5.7.
12Here, the basic idea is that a bidder is more likely to engage in tacit collusion if he always purchases from a
small number of suppliers.
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Table 5.7: Impact of policy change on potential bidder collusion.
Coefficient Estimate Std. error P-value
Collusion tendency (α01) -0.098 0.006 0.000 ***
Treatment period (β1) 0.127 0.003 0.000 ***
Treatment site (β2) -0.002 0.012 0.858
Treatment period ∗ Treatment site (β3) 0.042 0.005 0.000 ***
Collusion tendency ∗ Treatment
period ∗ Treatment site 0.035 0.013 0.009 **
Adjusted R2: 0.190
We can see that bidders with higher tendency of collusion indeed pay significantly lower
(9.8%) prices when winners’ identities are disclosed. Thus H1 is supported. Further, Table 5.7
shows that the “advantage” of these bidders is mitigated under the treatment condition, suggest-
ing that withholding winners’ identities can reduce the potential tacit collusion.
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Key Findings
Our paper offers several findings with regard to information transparency strategies in sequential
auctions. First, we find that overall, bidders tend to pay higher prices when the identities of
winners from previous (sub)auctions are not publicly disclosed. Such positive effects hold for
both online and offline bidders. This means that the weak signals or the increased market state
information available in the auction room cannot compensate for the loss of the information
associated with winners’ identities. At the outset, this finding contradicts the predictions of
linkage principle, which suggests that releasing more information can increase sellers’ revenue.
Therefore, it calls for finer-grained models to characterize the bidding dynamics in real-world
multi-unit sequential auctions.
Further, we provide empirical evidence of declining price anomaly under two revelation
policies and show that the less transparent policy can mitigate the price declining trend. Such
finding to a large extent confirms the direct-learning effect in sequential auctions (Jeitschko,
1998). In other words, bidders base their inferences of the market trend not only on the revealed
prices in previous rounds, but also the revealed winners’ information. Thus it sheds new lights
on the explanations to declining price anomaly (Van den Berg et al., 2001). We also explore
the potential explanations to the observed price increase associated with the policy change by
examining bidders’ tendency to commit tacit collusion. Our results show that bidders who stick
to a small set of trading partners and thereby have higher tendency to collude incur a significant
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loss of surplus under the less transparent setting. This suggests that winners’ identities might
be used to enforce the agreement within cartels and deter each other from bidding high.
5.6.2 Contribution
Our findings contribute to the existing literature on information disclosure in auctions. Previous
studies on information revelation policies are largely restricted to analytical modeling where
bidders are assumed to be fully rational or lab experiments where bidders are typically less
experienced. Our research complements them by bringing richness of real-world operation en-
vironments while maintaining a high level of control. In addition, despite the growing interest
in information revelation policies in online auctions, for example, Arora et al. (2007); Grana-
dos et al. (2010); Greenwald et al. (2010), most of the existing research focuses on price and
product transparency. We provide a different perspective to examine the linkage principle and
the current debate between transparency strategies.
The findings from our study also provide important implications to practice. Previous re-
search has shown that sequential auctions are more susceptible to collusion as compared to
simultaneous auctions (Sherstyuk and Dulatre, 2008). Thus how to effectively detect collusive
bidding and deter future collusion is a major issue in the practical design of sequential auctions.
In our study, we find that withholding winners’ identities in sequential auctions can reduce the
potential tacit collusion. In fact, the results from our analysis shows that bidders with higher
tendency of collusion is expected to pay significantly higher when winners’ identities were not
communicated publicly.
As Koppius (2002) points out, information architecture –“what type of information is avail-
able to whom, or when and how it becomes available to whom during the market process”–
is important for the performance of auctions. With the ongoing trend of moving from place
to space (Kuruzovich et al., 2008), choosing appropriate information revelation policy across
different market channels becomes even more critical in the design of these multi-channel auc-
tions. Note that although online channels could in principle encourage entry by breaking the
physical limitations such as time and space and bringing millions of globally dispersed business
entities to the trading activities in auctions, the enhanced communication capabilities resulting
from online channels also facilitate collusive behavior. Therefore, market designers must weigh
the benefits and threats carefully when disclosing any product- or market-related information.
5.6.3 Limitation and Future Work
The current study bears several limitations. For example, due to practical constraints, we could
not extend the experiment period to a longer time and as the result, we were not able to examine
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whether the increase in transaction prices is persistent, or bidders’ behavior might gradually
converge after a longer time and the price will fall back to the pre-experiment period (when other
factors are controlled). Additionally, we could not infer the complementarity or substitutability
of different products from the current dataset and take them into account in the DID model.
If there was a demand shock of another product which serves as a complement of the product
chosen in our analyses, it would have led to an overestimation of the actual effect of the policy
change. However, there is no particular evidence of such demand shock, nor significant change
in bidders’ bidding patterns (see Table 5.1). Therefore, this is not a big concern in this paper.
Future work can take transaction data from multiple types of products to verify the robustness
of our results.
A number of directions are possible as the extension of the current research. Our current
analysis only suggests that bidders with higher tendency of tacit collusion pay lower prices
under the high-transparent situation (i.e., when winners’ identities are disclosed) and incur a
substantial loss of surplus under the low-transparent situation. It is interesting to identify and
understand the intermediate mechanism by which those bidders acquire and lose the advantage.
Further, given that these are B2B auctions, it is also necessary to examine the impact of the pol-
icy change to the post-auction trades. For example, it is much more difficult for the customers
of a bidder to trace the original purchasing prices in the auction market. This might provide
the bidder an opportunity to maximize his profit margin and thus affect his bidding strategies in
the auctions. An integrated model which incorporates the post-auction competition can be very
helpful in understanding the impact of different revelation policies in the whole supply chain.
5.6.4 Concluding Remark
We study the impact of different information revelation policies in sequential B2B auctions
using field experiment. Our analyses document a significantly positive effect on transaction
prices associated with the less-transparent policy which conceals winners’ identities. This result
suggests that higher transparency might, despite all the well-known advantages, facilitate tacit
collusion and mitigate competition.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we first summarize the findings from the three specific studies and then continue
with a discussion of the theoretical contributions and managerial implications. Finally, we also
reflet on the limitations of the current research and present an outline for future work.
6.1 Main Findings
Our central research question is how to leverage the power of data to improve the design and
operationalization of complex auction markets. We address this question by systematically
examining the interplay of different informational and strategic factors in three specific studies.
Adaptive Design. In Chapter 3, we develop a structural econometric model to understand the
effect of auction design parameters on sellers’ revenues. By recovering bidders’ value distribu-
tion and their bidding functions under different market conditions, we empirically demonstrate
the influence of auction design parameters on bidders’ willingness-to-pay and market clear-
ing speed. Specifically, we find that increasing minimum purchase quantity can speed up the
market clearing process significantly, albeit the considerable cost in revenue. In light of this,
we develop a dynamic optimization approach which makes use of the rich structural properties
identified from historical data to guide auctioneers in setting the auction design parameters.
Based on our simulation results, such data-driven optimization approach can help to gener-
ate significantly higher revenue while maintaining a high throughput. Therefore, it has great
promises in facilitating auctioneers’ real-time decision making.
Bidder Heterogeneity. Chapter 4 examines bidders’ strategic decisions across different mar-
ket channels. Using a unique and extensive data set which contains transaction details from
both online and offline channels, we find a stable taxonomy which consists of five types of
bidding strategies. Although some of the strategic types bear similarities with those identified
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from B2C context (Bapna et al., 2004; Goes et al., 2012), we also observe interesting nuances.
For example, on average, neither opportunistic bidders nor early evaluators won in more than
one auction on any given day. This reflects the fundamental difference in bidders’ incentive
structure in B2B and B2C markets. Additionally, given that all the bidders in our case have rich
bidding experience, the existence of these distinct bidding strategies challenges the common
notion that bidders’ strategies will converge as they gain experience, suggesting that we should
pay more attention to the economic factors, for example, bidders’ budget constraints and trans-
action costs, instead of the process-dependent factors such as bidders’ participation or winning
experience in B2B auctions. We also perform outcome analysis on different strategic types and
examine their interactions with key auction design parameters such as lot size and minimum
purchase quantity. The results from our analysis show that opportunistic bidders perform best
in minimizing their loss-of-surplus. Further, we find significant moderating effects of lot size
and minimum purchase quantity on bidding strategies. These findings reinforce the importance
of real-time segmentation of bidder population in these sequential auctions.
Information Transparency. Chapter 5 investigates the impact of information revelation pol-
icy on price dynamics and market outcome. Using a field experiment, we find that bidders tend
to pay higher prices when the identities of winners from previous (sub)auctions were concealed
from public view. Such positive effect holds for both online and offline bidders, suggesting
that the weak signals or the increased market state information from the offline channel (auc-
tion rooms) cannot compensate for the loss of the additional information conveyed via winners’
identities. In addition, our analysis shows that anonymizing the winning bids can also mitigate
the price declining trend in sequential rounds.
At the outset, our finding contradicts the prediction of the linkage principle, which states
that sellers are better off by revealing more information to bidders. Since previous research
suggested that linkage principle can fail if bidders cooperate in the bidding process, we created
a proxy of bidders’ tendency of tacit collusion in these auctions and compared the average
prices paid by bidders with high and low tendency of tacit collusion under different revelation
policies. The result shows that bidders with high tendency of collusion paid significantly lower
than those with low tendency of collusion when winners’ identities are disclosed. However,
when the winning bids were anonymized, such advantage associated with the potential tacit
collusion diminished substantially.
Overall, we have illustrated and quantified the benefits of data-driven decision making in
dynamic, complex auction markets. Figure 6.1 depicts a conceptual model of data-driven deci-
sion making in these markets. Here, bidder type is determined by the business characteristics of
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a bidder, for example, his budget constraint, channel affiliation. Market process is defined as the
processes of information exchange in the market. Market outcome refers to the transactions that
result from the market process. Both market process and market outcome are descriptive (Kop-
pius, 2002). Data analytics refers to the practice of collecting, evaluating and analyzing data
to inform decisions. This include different types of analytical models, as well as advanced
computational tools such as agent-based simulations (Ketter et al., 2012).
Bidder 
Type
Bidder 
Strategy
Bidder
Outcome
Individual Level
Market Level
Auction
Design 
Parameter
Information
Revelation
Policy
Market 
Process
Market 
Outcome
Data Analytics
Figure 6.1: A conceptual model of data-driven decision-making in auction markets.
6.2 Scientific Contributions
This dissertation makes valuable contributions to the empirical auction literature. First of all,
the three specific studies (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) together have greatly improved our understanding
of real-time bidding in complex auction markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first research that systematically examines the interplay of informational and strategic factors
in multi-channel B2B auction market. Second, our findings offer a high level of granularity to
the general principles for auction design, i.e., encourage competition and discourage collusion.
Third, this research also shed new lights on some interesting phenomenons which have attracted
the attention of auction researchers for long (e.g., declining price anomaly, linkage principle).
Further, it also contributes to the nascent literature of smart markets (Bichler et al., 2010). In
particular, the dynamic optimization approach proposed in Chapter 3 serves as a useful starting
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point for the development of real-time decision support systems for auctioneers. In addition,
the bidder taxonomy developed in Chapter 4 can be viewed as a micro-segmentation of the
bidder population, which is the prerequisite for the customization of design parameters as well
as information strategies across different channels.
Finally, our research makes important methodological contribution. Specifically, in Chapter
3, we extended the existing structural models to explicitly address the sequential aspects and
bidders’ multi-unit demand in each round. Currently, most of the structural modeling work fo-
cuses on single-unit auctions, for example, Donald and Paarsch (1996); Guerre et al. (2000);
Laffont and Vuong (1995); Paarsch (1997). Of the few papers which investigated multi-unit se-
quential auctions (Brendstrup, 2002; Brendstrup and Paarsch, 2006; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendor-
fer, 2003), bidders are either assumed to have single-unit demand throughout an auction or they
can acquire at most one unit in each round. Relaxing the single-unit assumption introduces a
number of econometric and computational challenges to the structural modeling of sequential
auctions. We exploit the unique features of the empirical auction environment to model bid-
ders’ sequential decision-making process. In order to estimate the key parameter of the model,
i.e., the number of bidders in each round of the sequential auctions, we developed an iterative
method using simulations. The extensive modeling effort has led to many new insights about
multi-unit sequential auctions. In addition, we have combined machine learning techniques with
advanced statistical models to explore bidder heterogeneity in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5,
we applied one of the state-of-the art techniques (i.e., difference-in-differences) to identify the
causal effect of information revelation policy change using the experiment data.
6.3 Managerial Implications
Our research suggests that theoretically guided computational tools have great promise in fa-
cilitating the design and operationalization of complex auction markets. In order to address the
cognitive and computational limitations of human decision makers in their real-time decision
making process, we propose to augment their judgment with high-performance decision sup-
port tools in the form of software agents (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995). These agents will
assist users in a collaborative manner, gathering and presenting information and recommending
actions. In order to be helpful, these agents should have the following core capabilities:
• Identification of the structural properties. The software agent can identify the structural
properties such as bidders’ value distribution from all the available information in the
market, for example, winning bids and purchase quantities in previous transactions.
• Prediction of the future auction states. As soon as the agent learns the structural properties
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of the underlying auction model, it can make predictions of future prices, purchase quan-
tities as well as the market trends (Ketter et al., 2012). Although existing approaches for
price prediction vary considerably, it has been widely recognized that predictions should
exploit all the available information and take the market structure (bidder segmentation)
into account.
• Optimization of the auction design. Based on the prediction of the future states, the agent
can dynamically set the key auction parameters and choose information revelation policy
with respect to some performance metrics (for example, seller revenue). In addition, the
agent can communicate with the human user about such performance metrics at any point
of the sequential auction and adjust the optimization process accordingly.
Although the dynamics of auctions are the immediate context of this research, we can in-
terpret individuals’bids as examples of important individual or organizational decisions. For
example, many organizations participate regularly in auctions as they compete for contracts
or projects, and executives and management teams often find themselves caught in a bidding
war to acquire companies or to hire new talents. In addition, information overload is not only
restricted to the auction market. As Simon (1971) said, “a wealth of information creates a
poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance
of information sources that might consume it.” In this regard, this research has useful implica-
tions for understanding a broad spectrum of decision-making processes in real-world business
environments.
6.4 Limitations
The current research adopts a multi-method approach to examine the real-time decision making
in auction markets. The combination of different methods such as structural modeling, simula-
tion and field experiments leads to a higher validity as compared to research which employs a
single method. That said, this research still bears several limitations.
To start with, we chose a specific type of product in each of the three specific study. How-
ever, as we discussed in Chapter 4, in reality, there is substitutability or complementarity be-
tween different products, and this clearly influences bidders’ bidding decisions. However, since
we did not have access to bidders’ order-books, nor the general information about their pref-
erences towards different product assortments, it was not possible to control for this factor in
modeling or clustering of bidding strategies. This might distort some of our findings in Chapter
3 and Chapter 4.
Second, when modeling the real-time bidding in these multi-channel auctions, we exclude
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transactions made when the market was likely to experience a shock due to demand surge (for
example, on Valentine’s Day), supply plunge, or other internal and external factors. Here,
our main concern is that these market shocks might result in severe behavioral shocks (See the
discussion in Section 3.5.2) that must be isolated and studied separately from the regular bidding
decision making in the market. Since in this research we are more interested in identifying the
regularities of these complex markets and quantifying the value of data-driven decision making,
we think such simplification is appropriate, although it may limit the prediction power of our
models.
Third, we did not consider the influence of post-auction markets on bidding strategies in the
analysis of information transparency (Chapter 5). However, According to Chen and Vulcano
(2009), the information disclosed in the upstream auctions can affect the profitability in the
downstream resale markets. They have found that the risk of revealing private information in
the downstream resale market induces lower bids than the ones that would be submitted under
conventional auctions without post-auction markets. Following this rationale, we might have
alternative explanations to the findings in Chapter 5. In particular, under the current auction
practice, winners’ identities are disclosed during the auction phase. Given the B2B nature of
these auctions, this means bidders incur the risk of exposing themselves to their direct competi-
tors as well as customers in the resale markets. To mitigate such threat, bidders shade their bids
more under higher transparent condition. With the current evidence, we cannot tell which is
the main driver of the price increase observed in the experiment period, the post-auction market
effect or the potential collusion effect, or both. Nevertheless, this limitation, just as the others
mentioned above, also opens up avenues for future research.
6.5 Future Work
We conclude this dissertation with an outline for future work. First of all, in order to address
the aforementioned limitations, we need to extend our current models to accommodate the
real-world complications. In most cases, the traditional game-theoretic models are insufficient
to guide the practical design. In light of this, an interesting direction to pursue is to develop
rich simulation platform which allow us to create different bidder profiles and experiment with
alternative auction designs under different information revelation policies. This can help us
develop better understanding of the interplay of different informational and strategic factors in
real markets and thus lead to more useful implications for practice.
Further, as Smith (1990) states, “auctions are social processes capable of defining and re-
solving inherently ambiguous situations, especially questions of value and price.” Given the
B2B nature of these auctions, both bidders’ decisions and market outcomes are influenced by
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the social structure. This suggests that we should adopt a social embeddedness approach (Gra-
novetter, 1985) and look into the social relations or networks within this market. In this sense,
the study in Chapter 5 only touched upon the surface of this topic by examining the potential
collusion. Much more work remains to be done.
The massive data generated from different markets provides ample opportunities for both
businesses and academics. However, the full exploitation of these opportunities requires not
only the understanding of general principles that govern the specific market, but also the devel-
opment of advanced modeling and computational tools. Therefore, we as information systems
researchers need to work closely with scholars from other areas such as economics, computer
science, and operations management, as well as practitioners from different application do-
mains.
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Summary
Over the past decades, the increased accessibility of data has enabled a different way of making
decisions that involves more empirical evidence rather than intuition and experience. Such
data-driven decision making has attracted a growing interest from both business practitioners
and academic researchers. This dissertation consists of three specific studies that illustrate and
quantify the benefits of data-driven decision making in the design and operationalization of
complex auction markets.
In the first study (Chapter 3), we derive a structural econometric model to understand the
effect of auction design parameters on sellers’ revenues. By recovering bidders’ value distribu-
tion and their bidding functions under different market conditions, we are able to empirically
measure the impact of auction design parameters on bidders’ willingness-to-pay and market
clearing speed. We also develop a dynamic optimization approach which makes use of the rich
structural properties identified from historical data to guide auctioneers in setting the key auc-
tion parameters. Based on the simulation results, such data-driven optimization approach can
help to generate significantly higher revenue while maintaining a high throughput and thereby,
has great promises in facilitating auctioneer’s real-time decision making.
In the second study (Chapter 4), we explore bidding strategies in a multi-channel B2B mar-
ket. Using a unique and extensive data set which contains transaction details over a long period
of time, we find a stable taxonomy which consists of five distinct types of bidding strategies.
Although some of the strategic types bear similarities with those identified in previous studies
of B2C markets, we also observe interesting nuances. We also perform outcome analysis on
different strategic types and examine their interactions with auction design parameters. Our
findings reinforce the importance of real-time segmentation of bidder population in these se-
quential auctions.
In the third study (Chapter 5), we investigate the effect of information revelation policy
on price dynamics and market performance. Using a field experiment, we find that bidders
tend to pay higher prices when the identities of winners are concealed from public view. Such
positive effect holds for both online and offline bidders, suggesting that the weak signals or the
increased market state information from the offline channel cannot compensate for the loss of
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the additional information conveyed via winners’ identities. In addition, our analysis shows that
anonymizing the winning bids can also mitigate the price declining trend in sequential rounds.
Overall, this research offers important implications to both theory and practice of decision-
making in complex, dynamic markets. From the theoretical perspective, this is, to our best
knowledge, the first research that systematically examines the interplay of different informa-
tional and strategic factors in multi-channel auction markets. In particular, it sheds new light on
real-time decision support in complex markets and thus contributes to the nascent literature of
smart markets. From the managerial perspective, our research shows that advanced data ana-
lytics tools have great potential in facilitating decision-making in complex, real-world business
environments.
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Samenvatting
In de afgelopen decennia heeft de toegenomen toegankelijkheid van gegevens een andere manier
mogelijk gemaakt van het nemen van beslissingen die meer gebruik maken van empirisch be-
wijs in plaats van persoonlijke ervaring, intuı¨tie, of bepaalde overtuigingen. Dergelijke data
gedreven besluitvorming is aan een groeiende belangstelling van zowel zakelijke professionals
als academische onderzoekers onderhevig. Deze dissertatie bestaat uit drie specifieke studies
die de meerwaarde van data gedreven besluitvorming illustreren en kwantificeren bij het on-
twerp en de operationalisering van complexe veilingen.
In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk 3), leiden we een structureel econometrisch model af om het
effect van ontwerp keuzes op de omzet van verkopers. Door het vinden van de waarde dis-
tributie van bieders en de manier waarop ze bieden onder verschillende marktomstandigheden,
meten we empirisch de impact van de veiling ontwerp keuzes op de bereidheid-tot-betalen van
bieders en de transactie snelheid. We ontwikkelen ook een dynamische optimalisatie methode
die gebruik maakt van de rijke structurele eigenschappen die geı¨dentificeerd zijn aan de hand
van historische gegevens om veilingmeesters te begeleiden bij het maken van de belangrijkste
keuzes betreffende het design van een veiling. Op basis van de resultaten van de simulatie,
maakt een dergelijke data gedreven optimalisatie benadering aanzienlijk hogere opbrengsten
mogelijk met behoud van een hoge doorvoer en heeft daardoor grote potentie in het faciliteren
van de real-time besluitvorming van de veilingmeester.
In de tweede studie (hoofdstuk 4), onderzoeken we biedstrategiee¨n in een B2B markt met
meerdere afzetkanalen. Met behulp van een unieke en uitgebreide dataset die transactiegegevens
over een lange tijdsperiode bevat vinden we een stabiele taxonomie die bestaat uit vijf verschil-
lende soorten biedstrategiee¨n. Hoewel sommige van de strategische types gelijkenissen verto-
nen met de types die geı¨dentificeerd werden in de eerdere studies van de B2C context, zien
we ook interessante nuances. We analyseren ook de impact van de verschillende strategische
soorten gedrag en onderzoeken de interactie tussen deze en de veiling ontwerp keuzes. Onze
bevindingen versterken het belang van real-time segmentatie van de bieder populatie in deze
sequentie¨le veilingen.
In de derde studie (hoofdstuk 5), onderzoeken we het effect van het beleid ten aanzien van
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openbaring van informatie op de prijs dynamiek. Met behulp van een veldexperiment vinden
we dat bieders de neiging hebben om hogere prijzen te betalen als de namen van de winnaars
afgeschermd zijn. Dit positieve effect gaat zowel op de online als de offline bieders, wat sug-
gereert dat de zwakke signalen of de toegenomen informatie over de markt van het offline kanaal
niet kan compenseren voor het verlies van additionele informatie die overgebracht werd door
de identiteiten van winnaars. Bovendien blijkt uit onze analyse dat het anonimiseren van het
winnende bod de dalende trend in de prijs kan verzachten door de identiteiten van winnaars te
verhullen in opeenvolgende ronden.
Kortom, dit onderzoek draagt belangrijke implicaties bij aan zowel theorie als praktijk van
besluitvorming in complexe, dynamische markten. Vanuit het theoretisch perspectief is dit,
zover wij weten, het eerste onderzoek dat systematisch de wisselwerking tussen verschillende
informatieve en strategische factoren onderzoekt bij veilingen met meerdere afzetkanalen. In
het bijzonder werpt het een nieuw licht op de real-time ondersteuning van de besluitvorming in
complexe markten en draagt het zo bij aan de literatuur in wording over smart markets. Qua
relevantie voor de manager, toont ons onderzoek aan dat geavanceerde data analyse een grote
potentie heeft in het faciliteren van de besluitvorming in de complexe, zakelijke omgeving.
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This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the promises of data-driven
decision making in the design and operationalization of complex auction markets. In the
first essay, we derive a structural econometric model to understand the effect of auction
design parameters on sellers' revenues. In addition, we develop a dynamic optimization
approach which makes use of the rich structural properties identified from empirical data
to guide auctioneers in setting these parameters in real-time. In the second essay, we
focus on bidding strategies across different market channels and examine the interactions
between different strategies and auction design parameters. In the third essay, we
investigate the effect of information revelation policy on price dynamics and market
performance. This research offers important implications to both theory and practice of
decision-making in information-rich and time-critical markets. From the theoretical
perspective, this is, to our best knowledge, the first research that systematically examines
the interplay of different informational and strategic factors in dynamic, multi-channel
auction markets. In particular, it sheds light on real-time decision support in complex
markets and thus contributes to the nascent literature on smart markets. From the
managerial perspective, our research shows that advanced data analytics tools have great
potential in facilitating decision-making in complex, real-world business environments.
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